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ABSTRACT 
 In recruiting, the phrase “you recruit who you are” describes a presumed 
relationship—recruiters attract and enlist individuals who are similar to themselves or 
within their in-group. This research evaluates the correlation of high-quality recruiters on 
high-quality enlistees. For the 264,681 recruiter-enlistee pairs from 2011 to 2019, quality 
is defined and determined for both recruiters and enlistees with five metrics using DOD 
enlistment standards and Marine Corps promotion and retention standards. I use linear 
probability models with RSS fixed effects and year fixed effects to hold constant market 
conditions and variations across years. Based on the five metrics, I find that high-quality 
recruiters have a consistently positive estimated effect on high-quality enlistees across all 
metrics with several effects statistically significant. I surmise that, by determining which 
Marines are high-quality prior to their assignment to recruiting, the Marine Corps may 
affect the quality of the enlistees at accession. Because force design necessitates 
higher-quality accessions, this thesis therefore recommends that the Marine Corps 
consider sending more high-quality Marines to recruiting duty to potentially improve the 
quality of the warfighting organization. Conversely, if the Marine Corps does not 
prioritize and send high-quality Marines to recruiting duty, then the Marine Corps may 
pay the price with lower quality enlistees. 
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“You recruit who you are” describes the presumed relationship between a recruiter 
and the individual they recruit, the enlistee, and how the recruiter will attract those enlistees 
most similar to themselves. This research focuses specifically on the quality relationship 
between the recruiter and the enlistee. First, I will define quality. Next, I will estimate the 
effect of high-quality (HQ) recruiters on HQ enlistees using historical data. As a disclaimer, 
it is important to note that correlation does not necessarily mean causation. Finally, I will 
recommend a more targeted approach to the assignment of high-quality (HQ) Marines to 
recruiting duty based on these estimates. Quality must first be defined since the term is 
used without a common definition. I use five separate metrics based on existing standards 
to objectively determine HQ while minimizing assumptions. Metrics 1–4 are depicted in 
Figure 1, with the numbers given representing each components weight within the score 
and the maximum possible score. Metric 5 for the recruiter and enlistee is not depicted. 
Each of the metrics provides a separate definition of quality with some overlap. For 
both recruiters and enlistees, I determine HQ by Metric 1 if the individual graduated high 
school and scored above 50 on the AFQT (an Alpha). I determine HQ by Metrics 2–4 if 
the individual’s score within the metric exceeded the 60th percentile for either all enlistees 
or all recruiters.  
For Metric 5, there is a different method for the recruiter and enlistee. I determine 
HQ by enlistee Metric 5 if they promoted to E5 within the first 25% of their MOS peer 
group. I determine HQ by recruiter Metric 5 if their average cumulative relative value was 
higher than 93.3 (they were in the top third). HQ recruiters are labeled HQR1-5 for Metrics 
1–5 and HQ enlistees are labeled HQE1-5 for Metrics 1–5. 
After determining which enlistees and recruiters were HQ, I evaluate the correlation 
to determine how well each of the metrics categorize HQ compared to the other metrics. 
Metrics 1 and 5 have low correlation and Metrics 2–4 have high correlation for both 
recruiters and enlistees. 
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Figure 1. Metric Components and Scoring 
 
As a means of defining quality, Metric 1 and 5 are less useful than Metrics 2–4. 
Metric HQE1 has low correlation with the other metrics and, with 72% designated HQ 
based on metric HQE1, Metric 1 is not very selective. Also, enlistees that attrite prior to 
completing MOS school can be determined HQ by metric HQE1 though these individuals 
are not desirable. Metric HQE5 is less useful for implementation to identify first-term HQ 
enlistees for three reasons: low correlation for metrics HQE1-5 meaning individuals do not 
qualify as HQ across metrics; with only 5% of the enlistee population designated as HQ 
Metric 1: DOD Enlistment Standards         
AFQT >= 50             
Education Tier I             
Metric 2: Legacy Composite Score Method         
Physical Fitness Test Score 167 11%     
Combat Fitness Test Score 167 11%         
Rifle Score (Table I)  167 11%         
Proficiency Marks Average 500 33%         
Conduct Marks Average 500 33%         
Total 1500           





    
Physical Fitness Test Score 125 13%         
Combat Fitness Test Score 125 13%         
Rifle Score (Table I&II) 125 13%         
Martial Arts Belt Score 125 13%         
AFQT Score (Proxy) 250 25%         
Proficiency & Conduct Marks 
(Proxy) 250 25%         
Total 1000           
 
 
Metric 4: Reenlistment Tier Evaluation Method         
Proficiency Marks Average 500 23%     
Conduct Marks Average 500 23%         
Rifle Score (Table I & II) 350 16%         
Physical Fitness Test Score 300 14%         
Combat Fitness Test Score 300 14%         
Martial Arts Belt Scaled Score 100 5%         
Meritorious Promotion 100 5%         
Total 2150           
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based on HQE5 this metric is too selective; and 48 months of service now required prior to 
promotion to E5 based on recent policy changes that limit the usefulness of this metric in 
the future. Metric HQR5 is less useful because it excludes junior sergeants that lack 
FITREP data and, therefore, the metric would be difficult to implement by MMEA-25 to 
determine assignment of all Marines to recruiting duty. Metrics 2–4 are more useful to 
determine HQ for both the enlistees and the recruiters because these metrics have high 
correlation and categorize many of the same individuals as HQ. Additionally, the data for 
the Metric 2–4 components is available for all Marines and these scores can be computed 
regardless of time in service or rank. 
With the defined HQ standards for 264,681 enlistees from 2011 to 2019 and 12,125 
recruiters, this research evaluates the 264,681 recruiter-enlistee pairs. I control for the 
recruiting substation to remove bias due to differences in market conditions, and I control 
for the year the enlistee shipped to recruit training to remove bias between ship years. Table 
1 depicts the coefficient estimates with positive estimated effects highlighted green. If the 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant, they are labeled with asterisks to denote 
the level of confidence at 99% (“***”), 95% (“**”), or 90% (“**”). 
Table 1. Quality Effects of Recruiters on Enlistees 
 
The models include recruiting station fixed effects to hold constant market conditions between 
RSSs and year fixed effects to hold constant the years the enlistees ship to recruit training. The 
results depict a total of 25 regressions using OLS LPMs with the metrics HQE1-5 as the dependent 
variables and metric HQR1-5 as the explanatory variables. The symbols “***” indicate significance 
at the 99% level of confidence, “**” at the 95% level of confidence, and “*” at the 90% level of 
confidence. The color green indicates a positive estimated effect for the coefficient estimates. 
HQE1 HQE2 HQE3 HQE4 HQE5
0.010    0.002     0.004     0.000     0.001     
*** **
0.003    0.004     0.004     0.003     0.000     
*
0.007    0.004     0.002     0.003     0.002     
*** *
0.004    0.004     0.002     0.004     0.001     
* *
0.005    0.005     0.005     0.004     0.003     







The results depict the estimated positive effects of the HQ recruiter metrics on the 
HQ enlistee metrics:  
• Metric HQR1 HQ recruiters contract HQ enlistees across all metrics and at 
statistically significant rates for metrics HQE1,3. 
• Metric HQR2 HQ recruiters contract HQ enlistees across all metrics and at 
statistically significant rates for metric HQE3.  
• Metric HQR3 HQ recruiters contract HQ enlistees across all metrics and at 
statistically significant rates for metrics HQE1,2.  
• Metric HQR4 HQ recruiters contract HQ enlistees across all metrics and at 
statistically significant rates for metrics HQE2,4.  
• Metric HQR5 HQ recruiters contract HQ enlistees across all metrics and at 
statistically significant rates for metrics HQE1-3,5 
Between these metrics, the Marine Corps should consider incorporating any of 
these metrics into the selection and assignment of Marines to recruiting duty. However, 
based on the statistically significant results for metric HQR5, the Marine Corps should 
consider incorporating FITREPs into their selection and assignment process. As depicted 
in Figure 2, the estimates for the HQR5 metric are consistent across all enlistee metrics. 
Although the HQR1 metric has the highest effect on the HQE1 metric, the HQR1 is not 
consistent across the other enlistee metrics and near 0 for the HQE4 metric. Furthermore, 
the metric HQR5 outperforms 17 of the other 20 models within each enlistee metric. 
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Figure 2. Recruiter HQ Estimated Effect on Enlistee HQ by Metric 
 
The graph depicts a total of 25 regression models for the estimated effects of the five- recruiter metrics on 
the five-enlistee metrics. “***” denotes significance at the 99% level of confidence, “**” denotes 
significance at the 95% level of confidence, and “*” denotes significance at the 90% level of confidence. All 
HQ recruiter metrics’ estimated effects are positive and grouped by the enlistee metric. 
When MMEA-25 initializes its roster from WebMASS, I recommend they use the 
HQR5 metric to identify the HQ Marines for assignment to recruiting duty for those 
Marines that have FITREP data. Incorporating FITREP data will require changes to the 
existing process, but, based on these estimated effects using empirical evidence, by 
determining which Marines are HQ prior to assignment, the Marine Corps may be able to 
improve enlistee quality at accession. Because force design necessitates HQ accessions, 
the Marine Corps should consider sending more HQ Marines to recruiting duty to 
xx 
potentially improve warfighting. Conversely, if the Marine Corps does not send HQ 
Marines to recruiting duty, then recruiters may contract lower quality enlistees. 
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Recruiting, developing, and retaining a high-quality military and civilian 
workforce is essential for warfighting success. Cultivating a lethal, agile 
force requires more than just new technologies and posture changes; it 
depends on the ability of our warfighters and the Department workforce to 
integrate new capabilities, adapt warfighting approaches, and change 
business practices to achieve mission success. The creativity and talent of 
the American warfighter is our greatest enduring strength, and one we do 
not take for granted. 
—John Mattis 
Summary, National Defense Strategy (2018) 
The Marine Corps reached a point of inflection in 2019, according to General 
Berger, the 38th Commandant. The service needed to make tough choices and understood 
that the transition to Great Power Competition (GPC) and the pivot to the Pacific required 
significant investment dollars for modernization that the Corps would not receive. Beyond 
the investment required in equipment, the Commandant understood that the service needed 
to invest in higher-quality individuals who could make difficult decisions at lower levels 
in the next fight. As a result, the Commandant has renewed focus on the quality of the 
force. He stated, “I understand the perspective of mass having a quality of its own, but right 
now, we need quality… and the force that we end up with will be much better” (Harkins, 
2020). How does the Marine Corps define quality? Is quality based on the DOD enlistment 
standards? Or perhaps quality is based on an individual reaching a certain rank by the end 
of their first enlistment: A Marine who promotes to Sergeant in four years is certainly a 
high-quality (HQ) individual. Or maybe quality is defined by what it is not: An individual 
who attrites prior to the end of their enlistment—whether in the Delayed Entry Program 
(DEP), recruit training, during their military occupational specialty (MOS) school or first 
duty station—certainly is not a HQ individual. Without first defining quality, the term takes 
on a nebulous and abstract meaning that undermines policy for recruiting the HQ 
individuals the Commandant seeks. 
Within the recruiting world, “you recruit you who are” is commonly heard and 
understood to mean that if an individual is HQ then they will attract and thereby enlist other 
2 
HQ individuals. This phrase, as the premise of this research, describes a relationship that 
underlies the transaction between the enlistee and the recruiter. One conclusion may be that 
the recruiter is the decision maker and decides whom to contract and therefore only 
approaches or contacts individuals who are similar to them. This conclusion may be wrong 
since the enlistee ultimately decides whether to contract and many recruiters face enormous 
pressure to meet mission. An alternative explanation is that the enlistee decides whether 
they are a fit for the Marine Corps based on their interaction and similarity with the 
recruiter. Either explanation supports in-group bias theory based on performance. 
Typically, in-group bias theory describes how individuals will favor groups similar to 
themselves (in-groups or we-groups) and, as a result, discriminate against groups dissimilar 
to themselves (out-groups or others-groups) (“In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup 
Situation,” 1979). However, more recently, research has shown that in-group bias exists 
within performance measures as well. Instead of individuals discriminating against the out-
group based solely on gender, race, or ethnicity; high performing individuals (based on 
their cognitive ability) also discriminate against the out-group (low performing based on 
cognitive ability) when making decisions (Paetzel & Sausgruber, 2018).  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is twofold. First, this research seeks to define quality 
for the enlistee and recruiter. What defines quality for an individual Marine is based on the 
different methods the service currently uses to categorize and rank Marines at enlistment, 
during their service, and when evaluating them for reenlistment. Second, based on these 
categorizations of HQ individuals, this research will explore the relationship between high-
quality (HQ) recruiters and HQ enlistees and estimate the effect of the HQ recruiters on 
HQ enlistees using historical data.  
Upon determining the estimated effect of the recruiter on the enlistee, I will attempt 
to evaluate the existing policy for assignment of individuals to recruiting duty. If in fact 
HQ recruiters are more likely to contract HQ enlistees and the Commandant prioritizes 
quality of the future force over other competing alternatives such as Drill Instructor (DI) 
Duty or Marine security guard detachment commander (MSG DC), then perhaps the 
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service should increase the standards for recruiters and apply a more targeted policy toward 
assignment of individuals to recruiting. Alternatively, if my research finds no evidence for 
a relationship between the quality of recruiter and enlistee, then it could mean that the 
quality of the recruiter is not as important, and the status quo may be optimal. Further, the 
Marine Corps may need to focus more on predictors of recruiter success such as 
salesmanship, confidence, or grit for assignment. 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Most of the existing literature focuses on market conditions with very little 
discussion of quality of recruiter or enlistee. The term “quality” is often used without 
definition and assumes an abstract meaning that is difficult to ascertain. The literature 
discusses market conditions as the major determinants for the enlistee’s quality: if an 
enlistee lives in an area with higher propensity to enlist and the area has a higher percentage 
of qualified males (high school graduates and higher scores on the AFQT), then the market 
is a HQ market. Unfortunately, the literature focuses little on the quality of the Marine 
recruiter and the resultant effect on the quality of enlistee who decides to join the Marines. 
This research will fill this gap and explore the relationship between the quality of the 
Marine recruiter and the quality of their enlistee. It is possible to evaluate low-quality 
Marine recruiters and low-quality enlistees when determining this relationship; however, 
this research focuses on the HQ relationship instead of low-quality. 
The study evaluates two separate populations who are paired based on the 
enlistment contract: the individual Marine recruiter and the individuals they recruit 
(enlistees). For the enlistees, the data includes all individuals who started service after 2011 
and before 2020. Recruiters are matched to the individuals they contract. The Marine Corps 
Recruiting Information Support System (MCRISS) records data at enlistment that includes 
characteristics such as the initial strength test scores, Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) score derived from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude and Battery Test 
(AFQT), demographic information, height and weight, level of education, geographic 
characteristics for the individual including their home of record and the specific recruiting 
substation, recruiting station, and district the individual enlisted within. If the individual 
4 
required a waiver or attrite during the delayed entry program (DEP) or recruiting training, 
this information also resides within the MCRISS. Performance data for the Marine is 
provided by the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) and includes: promotion dates and 
ranks; service obligations and description such as MOS and duty stations; marital and 
dependents status; performance evaluations such as proficient and conduct marks; 
individual scores on the rifle range, physical fitness test (PFT), combat fitness test (CFT), 
and belt attained in the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP); separation data; 
and awards data. For the recruiter, the same information was provided by MCRISS and 
TFDW. Additionally, Headquarters Marine Corps Performance Evaluation Section 
(MMRP-30) provided fitness report (FITREP) data for the recruiters. 
The data is used to develop metrics for quality and then evaluate the relationship 
between a HQ recruiter and a HQ enlistee as defined. There may be an effect given this 
relationship. Enlistees may encounter recruiters similar to themselves and determine the 
Marine Corps may pose a good fit for their personality and characteristics and in this 
scenario the enlistee makes the decision. Alternatively, there may actually be a negative 
relationship between the HQ recruiter and low-quality enlistee. The HQ recruiters may 
view the number of contracts as the criteria on which they will be evaluated and may 
prioritize quantity over quality. In this case, HQ recruiters will not attract HQ enlistees 
since the decision of who to contract is determined by the recruiter.  
It is important to note that correlation does not always mean causation and that 
unobserved omitted variables may bias the estimates. To attempt to identify causal effects, 
I attempt to remove potential bias caused by differing market conditions. Often, when the 
quality of the RSS market is discussed, a perception exists that recruiters assigned to HQ 
markets or markets with a higher propensity to enlist are more successful and, as a result, 
contract higher-quality individuals. Using fixed effects at the Recruiting Substation (RSS) 
level is an effort to reduce any omitted-variables bias stemming from average differences 
over time in the quality of available recruits across the RSSs. I also include year fixed 
effects based on the enlistees’ ship year to recruiting training to remove bias caused by 
differences in ship years.  
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Other effects may bias the estimates. For example, Chapter V, Part C discusses an 
alternative theory which I invalidate. In this theory, a recruiter may be more selective with 
their contracts and thereby contract fewer enlistees but with a higher percentage 
categorized as HQ. Although a different recruiter may actually contract more HQ enlistees 
than the first recruiter, the first recruiter would have a higher percentage identified as HQ. 
C. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Although necessary to determine the standard for quality with which to gauge the 
individual recruiters and enlistees, in practice this approach is challenging. No current 
standard defines which Marines are HQ, which necessitated casting a wide net in an attempt 
to capture a consistent metric. Alternatively, I could have used a single predictor of quality 
such as the Armed Forces Qualification Test score or an individual’s physical fitness score. 
But using these individual scores would have required me to make assumptions and these 
assumptions reduce the validity of the model. Therefore, I use multiple standards 
established by both the Department of Defense for accession and the Marine Corps for 
promotion and retention as the basis for five separate metrics to accomplish this task. By 
utilizing these metrics, I simplify the relationship and produced understandable and 
replicable results. Using four similar metrics for recruiters and enlistees and a fifth metric 
specific to each, I determine which Marines qualified as a HQ recruiter and HQ enlistee. 
HQ recruiters are labeled HQR1-5 for Metrics 1–5 and HQ enlistees are labeled HQE1-5 for 
Metrics 1–5. 
I establish a final model using ordinary least squares (OLS) linear probability model 
(LPM) regressions to estimate the relationship between the HQ recruiters and HQ enlistees. 
The conceptual model was simplified with just the HQ enlistee for metric 1–5 (HQE1-5) as 
the dependent variable and the HQ recruiter for metric 1–5 (HQR1-5) as the explanatory 
variable. This conceptual model introduces significant bias due to differing market 
conditions based on the location of the RSS. The model also introduces bias due to variation 
of HQ enlistees and recruiters within metrics based on the calendar year the enlistee 
shipped. I discuss these biases further in Chapter IV, Part A. The final model includes RSS 
fixed effects to hold constant the RSS and attempt to remove the market conditions 
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variation between RSSs. The final model also includes year fixed effects based on the 
enlistee ship year to recruit training to attempt to remove variation between accession 
years. The final model estimated effects from each of the HQ recruiters and HQ enlistees’ 
metrics are depicted within Table 1.  
Table 1. The Final Model: Estimated Effects of HQR1-5 Metrics on HQE1-5 
Metrics with Year and RSS Fixed Effects 
 
The final model includes RSS fixed effects to hold constant market conditions between RSSs. The 
results depict a total of 25 regressions using OLS LPMs with the HQE1-5 as the dependent variables 
and HQR1-5 as the explanatory variables. *** indicate significance at 99% level of confidence. The 
color green indicates a positive estimated effect for the coefficient estimates, and the color red 
indicates a negative estimated effect for the coefficient estimates. 
Based on these estimates, HQ recruiters defined by Metrics 1–5 are more likely to 
contract HQ enlistees defined by Metrics 1–5 but not at statistically significant rates across 
all metrics. HQ recruiters based on HQR5 outperform 17 of the other 20 models in their 
estimated effects and at statistically significant rates for four of the five HQR5 models. 
The Marine Corps should consider using any of these HQ recruiter metrics to 
increase the recruiter’s productivity of HQ enlistees. However, the most effective metric 
to increase HQ enlistees based on these estimates is metric HQR5. MMEA-25 should 
consider incorporating HQR5 into the identification and selection of Marines for 
assignment to the BRC. Based on this empirical evidence, HQ recruiters using the HQR5 
metric have the most consistent and statistically significant estimated positive effect on HQ 
enlistees. 
HQE1 HQE2 HQE3 HQE4 HQE5
0.010    0.002     0.004     0.000     0.001     
*** **
0.003    0.004     0.004     0.003     0.000     
*
0.007    0.004     0.002     0.003     0.002     
*** *
0.004    0.004     0.002     0.004     0.001     
* *
0.005    0.005     0.005     0.004     0.003     







D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
In Chapter II, I describe the assignment process to recruiting duty for both 
volunteers and Marines involuntarily assigned. This process starts with the volunteering or 
directed assignment to recruiting and ends with the Marine recruiter’s assignment to a 
specific location or recruiting substation (RSS). Within Chapter III, I explore the current 
literature on market conditions and how that affects recruiters’ performance. In Chapter 
IV, I describe the metrics used to categorize quality, my methodology, and summary 
statistics. Chapter V provides the results for this research. I then discuss the implications 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
9 
II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter will provide an overview of Marine Corps Recruiting Command 
(MCRC) structure and then describe the assignments process for recruiters. Recruiters 
receive assignment every fiscal year and the service must graduate approximately 1,066 
Marine recruiters each year (every 36 months, the Marine Corps requires 3,198 recruiters, 
a three-year requirement). Marines can volunteer for recruiting or receive involuntary 
assignment if the Marine Corps needs to fill an unmet requirement. The chapter will also 
describe attrition for the recruiters both before (pre-class) and during (in-class) when the 
recruiter attends the Basic Recruiter’s Course. The chapter then describes how Marines are 
selected for recruiting duty and then receive assignment to a specific RSS. Finally, other 
special duty assignments (SDA) are discussed since they select from the same population 
of individuals who receive assignment to recruiting. These other SDAs effectively 
“compete” for quality with recruiting. Extremely high attrition rates among Marines 
selected and even Marines who volunteer for recruiting duty makes it extremely difficult 
for the Marine Corps to fill the recruiting quotas each year. 
A. RECRUITING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
MCRC is separated between the Eastern Recruiting Region (ERR) and the Western 
Recruiting Region (WRR) and is further separated between six recruiting districts: 1st 
District (1MCD); 4th District (4MCD); 6th District (6MCD); 8th District (8MCD); 9th 
District (9MCD); and 12th District (12MCD). The districts are separated (MCRC Units, 
n.d.). Within the recruiting districts, 48 recruiting stations (RS) are further separated into 
626 recruiting substations (RSS) (Davin & Tomlinson, 2009). For a geographic depiction 






Figure 1. A Geographic Depiction of MCRC Recruiting Stations. Source: 
Davin and Tomlinson (2009).  
 
Figure 2. A Geographic Depiction of MCRC Recruiting Substations. Source: 




B. ASSIGNMENTS PROCESS 
Although Marines may either volunteer or receive involuntary assignment to 
recruiting duty, many of the Marines attrite during the process either pre-class or in-class. 
As a result, the Marine Corps must fill a high number of quotas to make up for this attrition. 
As an SDA, recruiting duty competes with MSG DC and DI Duty for the highest-quality 
individuals. Individuals receive assignment to a specific RSS during the BRC and most 
will communicate with an RS SgtMaj prior to their class. Marines have varying reasons for 
why they desire a specific location for recruiting, but they all have the option to request 
by-name assignments. The RS SgtMaj will either accept or reject an individual who 
requests a by-name assignment. Assignment for a 36-month tour to a specific RSS is 
determined most often by vacancies.  
As part of this research, I interviewed individuals from Marine Manpower Enlisted 
Assignments (MMEA), specifically MMEA-25 (Special Duty Assignments) including the 
unit head and recruiting monitor. From Marine Corps Recruiters School, I collectively 
interviewed the director, deputy director, sergeant major, and chief instructor. To gain an 
operational perspective from MCRC, I conducted individual interviews with the previous 
commanding officer for the 9MCD, the current commanding officer and sergeant major 
for RS New Jersey, the current commanding officer for RS Indianapolis, and the 9MCD 
sergeant major. These interviews provided a more general understanding of the process for 
assignment of an individual to recruiting duty, BRC, and a specific RSS.  
1. Assignment to the BRC 
Individuals can either choose to become a recruiter by volunteering or receive 
involuntary assignment. Once selected for recruiting, the individual attends a BRC class 
and then receives their follow-on RSS assignment.  
a. Volunteer 
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) solicits volunteers every year during the 
Special Duty Assignment Volunteer Period (SDAVP) approximately 12 months prior to 
the start of the fiscal year (FY) in October. Within this period from July 1 to December 31. 
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Marines can request the SDA of their choice. Typically, Marines who volunteer will submit 
their package and request to attend the BRC early in the FY (though they can volunteer 
year-round). Many Marines are told that if they volunteer, they can have more control over 
their career. From the commander’s perspective, most commanders misunderstand the 
process and assume that if a Marine is assigned to a BRC they will attend immediately 
though they will not attend BRC until October of the next FY (at the earliest). When an 
individual decides to volunteer, they notify their career planner within their unit and the 
career planner assists the Marine with completing the SDA screening checklist. The 
screening checklist consists of personal information including the Marine’s physical fitness 
scores, the Marine’s comments for why they want to be a recruiter or do not want to be a 
recruiter, basic screening information to determine eligibility, and their leadership’s 
recommendation (NAVMC 11704, 2019). The SDA screening checklist is the individual 
Marine’s responsibility. If the Marine (either involuntary or voluntary assignment) is 
recommended by their CO, recommended by the primary military occupational specialty 
(PMOS) monitor, and have no conditions within their contract that would prevent them 
from serving on recruiting duty, then the package is routed from the PMOS monitor to the 
Recruiting Monitor for a more in-depth screening and then assignment. If a Marine (either 
involuntary or voluntary assignment) is not recommended by their CO but recommended 
by the PMOS Monitor, then either the MMEA-2 Section Head (lieutenant colonel) or the 
MMEA Branch Head (colonel) make the decision. Then, the Marine receives assignment 
to one of six BRC classes during the FY. Historically, volunteer numbers do not fill the 
requirement. For example, of the 658 who volunteered for recruiting duty in FY20, only 
477 arrived to BRC (it is important to note that FY20 was affected by COVID-19).  
b. Involuntary Assignment through HSST Selection 
Alternatively, if a Marine has not volunteered during the volunteer period, an 
individual may receive involuntary assignment to recruiting duty by the HQMC SDA 
Selection Team (HSST). Although commonly understood as a “team,” the HSST is actually 
a process with no actual “team.” Through the HSST, Marines are assigned to fill unfilled 
requirements for the SDA including recruiting, MSG DC, or DI duty. The HSST is not 
scheduled but conducted as needed to meet the unfilled requirement, which historically 
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equates to convening at least once per FY. The first HSST is referred to as “HSST One” 
and the second as “HSST Two.” The requirement the HSST fills is based upon the 
graduation rate at BRC and requirements from MSG DC and DI. On average, five HSST 
Marines make one graduate and three volunteers make approximately two graduates at 
BRC due to attrition either pre-class or during the class (this topic will be discussed in 
depth in the next section titled “Attrition Pre-Class and During Class at BRC.”) In other 
words, approximately 80% of HSST Marines do not graduate. Figure 3 depicts the attrition 
for both pre-class and in-class.  
Figure 3. FY20 Attrition Percentages Pre-class and In-class. 





Using WebMASS, an integrated personnel management system, the SDA section 
casts a wide net and implement various filters that include careerist Marines, without 
orders, time on station requirements, rank requirements, stabilized for deployments, 
bonuses tied to financial incentives, and full duty status. These filters generate a roster of 
approximately 4,000 to 5,000 Marines (fluctuates based on the requirement) and much of 
the roster will fill the recruiting requirement. The MOS monitors receive the list and 
remove ineligible Marines and return the roster to MMEA-25. The DI monitor and MSG 
DC monitor select the individuals best qualified based on their strict requirements (such as 
first class PFT). Although the individual Marine’s command may have recommended them 
for a specific SDA, MMEA-25 can override any recommendations from a Marine’s local 
command but cannot override recommendations against recruiting duty (not 
recommended). The individual Marine’s preference receives some consideration, but the 
needs of the Marine Corps is the higher priority.  
Following completion of the roster, MMEA publishes the FY HSST roster via 
MARADMIN and Total Force Retention System (TFRS) message in January. Once it is 
confirmed that the requirement is met, the HSST results MARADMIN is released, at which 
point a decision is made whether a second HSST is required. If required, “HSST Two” fills 
any remaining unmet requirements for the year and, as a result, may include recruiting 
duty, DI, or MSG DC. If required, an announcement of FY HSST Two is published via 
MARADMIN in July. Upon receipt of the assignment, the Marine’s command is required 
to supervise the completion and submission of the checklist. If the Marine attrites pre-class, 
the unit is required to notify HQMC via TFRS within a reasonable amount of time or else 
they can be found non-compliant. For FY20, 1,356 Marines were assigned by HSST to 
BRC. Only 747 of those Marines arrived to BRC with 658 graduating. Figure 4 provides a 
visual depiction of both HSST Marines and volunteers and their corresponding attrition. 
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Figure 4. FY20 Recruiting HSST Marines and Volunteers. 
Source: C. Petersen personal communication (November 25, 2020). 
 
 
2. Pre-class and In-Class Attrition at the BRC 
Attrition for recruiting duty is high for both pre-class and in-class. According to 
MMEA-25, for FY19 and FY20, 45% of HSST Marines attrite pre-class and 29% of 
volunteer Marines attrite pre-class. During BRC, 16% of HSST Marines attrite in-class 
with 6% attrition of volunteers in class. In total, 61% of HSST Marines attrite compared 
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with the 35% of volunteers who attrite (C. Petersen, personal communication, November 
25, 2020).  
As previously described, the majority of volunteers request to attend BRC earlier 
in the FY. Because BRC conducts six classes per year with a maximum 250 students per 
class, most classes are not filled. For the first class, most of the students are volunteers. 
This proportion decreases and by the fourth class the split between volunteer and HSST 
Marine is close to even. By the sixth class, however, HSST Marines make up the majority 
of the class. Additionally, the quality of the Marines attending earlier in the FY is higher 
as evident by lower attrition. According to the BRC staff, overall, volunteers have lower 
percentage attrition for mental or medical health, better physical fitness, and recruiting duty 
is a better fit for their character and personality. As depicted in Table 2, during FY19, 50 
HSST Marines were dropped due to failing PFTs compared to only 12 volunteers during 
that same year. 
Table 2. Describes Attrition Compiled from BRC FY19 Drop Reports. 
Source: A. Carroll Keeley personal communication (September 8, 2020). 
 
 
Attrition at BRC is also high though many of the causes of attrition are not due to 
academics or misconduct. It is important to note that HSST Marines have higher attrition 
than volunteers at BRC. The issues that cause disenrollment are often issues the 
17 
individual’s chain of command could have identified in advance such as: whether an 
individual possesses a driver’s license; physical fitness level; and bodyfat percentage if an 
individual exceeds weight standards for their height. As a result, BRC conducts an 
additional screening upon the Marine’s arrival, which can result in disenrollment prior to 
the class starting. Upon arrival, BRC assesses the Marine’s mental, physical, moral 
capabilities and fitness for duty.  
While at BRC, Marines receive their final assignments to a RS and RSS. Described 
in more detail within the following section, this process works through coordination 
between the receiving RS SgtMaj, MCRC, and HQMC. The assignment for the Marine 
typically meets their stated preference with 72% of Marines receiving assignment to their 
first-choice district and 67% receiving assignment to their first choice RS. 19% do not 
receive one of their top three districts and 25% do no not receive one of their top three RS. 
The Marines who do not receive their preferred assignment are assigned based on the needs 
of the Marine Corps. Again, the majority of Marines receive their requested assignment.  
3. Assignment to an RS 
Marines often reach out to the Recruiting Monitor when contemplating 
volunteering for recruiting duty or once directed. Specific populations, such as dual active 
military, are required to reach out to an RS SgtMaj for a by-name request prior to reporting 
to BRC. Commonly asked questions about recruiting duty refer to specific challenges they 
may face, what the duty entails, and what technical skills could provide them with an 
advantage. Some Marines ask which recruiting markets are “easier” though this question 
is less common.  
The recruiting monitor advises the Marine. Specifically, once the Marine’s 
assignment to BRC is approved and six months prior to their report date, the recruiting 
monitor advises the Marine to reach out to the SgtMaj at their preferred RS and ask them 
for a “by-name request” (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2019a). The by-name-
request is between the Marine and the RS SgtMaj with no involvement from MMEA-25, 
BRC, or MCRC. For the “by-name request,” the Marine contacts the respective RS SgtMaj 
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either prior to submitting their package if they are trying to make a decision or once 
assigned to BRC.  
After initial communication, the RS SgtMaj will advise the Marine to continue 
communication prior to and during their BRC at which point they receive their orders and 
assignment. The RS SgtMaj comes to BRC and interviews the Marines. The SgtMaj then 
selects the individuals who they want (based on the by name requests). The roster is then 
sent to MCRC. The RS SgtMaj hold significant power for the specific RS assignment. As 
described during my interviews, the Marine requests a specific RS due to a wide variety of 
reasons. According to the RS SgtsMaj and staff at the Basic Recruiter Course who I spoke 
with, following are some of the more common reasons:  
• The Marine wants to recruit back home because they either know the 
people and believe they will be more effective or due to their family 
support structure 
• They want to recruit for leadership they served with previously 
• They want to go to a successful RS 
• Some want to go somewhere different or desire a specific geographic 
region 
• If the Marine has an exceptional family member (special needs), they 
may request assignment based on those specific needs 
• The Marine may be comfortable with a specific area due to a previous 
experience 
Although less common, some Marines do not request a specific RS and are willing 
to go anywhere. Within the RS, some Marines request a specific RSS, typically when they 
or their spouse are from that area.  
The RS SgtMaj receives the by-name-request and communicates directly with the 
Marine. The RS SgtMaj will not know whether the individual is a volunteer or directed 
assignment, they will simply determine whether they want the individual for their RS. 
Because some RSs are more competitive and receive excessive by-name-requests, 
depending on the RS the SgtMaj may need to rank them. When determining whether to 
add a Marine to the list and rank them among their other picks, the RS SgtMaj will consider 
the demographics of the Marine and of the recruiting market. Other criteria used include 
their performance as depicted on the Marine’s Master Brief Sheet, their Basic Individual 
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Record and Basic Training Record, and the screening checklist completed by the Marine’s 
chain of command. The RS SgtMaj may also look at their history of mental challenges and 
communicate back to BRC if the individual may not be qualified. The RS SgtMaj will also 
look at the individual’s promotion photo to determine how they look in uniform and gauge 
their physical fitness by evaluating their PFT and CFT scores. Most importantly, each RS 
SgtMaj has their own method of ranking individuals and often it is based on the recruiting 
market. For those regions with fewer by-name-requests, the RS SgtMaj may not have the 
flexibility of ranking applicants and will only determine whether to accept or reject them. 
For assignment to an RSS, vacancies are the most important consideration though the RS 
SgtMaj will also attempt to balance any RSS that lacks a specific quality. For example, the 
RS SgtMaj may send a high performing Marine (based on their Master Brief Sheet) to an 
RSS with low performers or a Spanish speaking Marine to a predominantly Spanish 
speaking RSS.  
4. Other SDA: DI and MSG DC 
Recruiting Duty also competes with the other SDA for quality Marines though the 
recruiting duty requirement far exceeds the other SDA. Marines who do not complete an 
SDA in recruiting may complete another SDA such as DI duty. Although many Marines 
volunteer, not all class seats are filled, and the Marine Corps must HSST additional 
individuals. For DI duty, the screening evaluates physical fitness especially—as depicted 
in Marine Corps Order 1326.6 (2019b), individuals must have a first-class physical fitness 
test (PFT) and combat fitness test (CFT). A first-class PFT is one of the indicators used to 
screen Marines for their ability to serve on the physically demanding drill field. Because 
many Marines volunteer for this SDA, the remaining requirement is typically filled with 
“HSST One” and few if any Marines are required on a “HSST Two.” For FY20, 200 or 
38.3% of the 522 Marines assigned to both depots were directed by the HSST. Figure 5 
depicts the HSST Marines for the FY20 DI Duty in relation to the other SDA. 
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Figure 5. HSST Marines by SDA. Source: C. Petersen personal 
communication (November 25, 2020). 
 
 
Finally, if a Marine does not volunteer or receive assignment to either recruiting 
duty or DI Duty, they may volunteer or receive assignment to MSG DC. Although there 
are less than 200 annual seats, as depicted in Figure 5, for FY20 154 HSST Marines were 
still required. Individuals must be highly competitive, highly recommended, and of 
excellent physical fitness (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2019a). Applicants 
and their families must also have excellent health since some of the embassies where 
individuals may be assigned around the world lack specialized healthcare. As a result, 
many Marines attrite pre-class either due to their personal or family health needs. Finally, 
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this SDA is the most selective since qualified applicants must pass an interview with 
Department of State personnel. Because many Marines volunteer for this SDA, the 
remaining requirement is typically filled with “HSST One” and very few Marines are 
required on a “HSST Two. For the 154 Marines in FY20 assigned (volunteer and HSST) 
to MSG DC, 102 or 66.2% arrived at the school.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the literature that focuses on military recruiting evaluates on market 
conditions that determine the quality of the enlistee or effectiveness of the recruiter. Some 
of the other military recruiting literature focuses on characteristics of the recruiter such as 
demographics, MOS, and home of record (an individual’s home address when they 
enlisted) in relation to their assigned location. Very little research has focused on individual 
recruiter match with the enlistee. What little research exists on this topic focuses on 
demographics (age, gender, race, and ethnicity) and their interaction but ignores the quality 
of the recruiter and corresponding quality of the enlistee. What research does explore the 
quality of an enlistee, limits quality to DOD enlistment standards and attrition. However, 
using this standard results in categorizing the majority of Marines who enlist as HQ since 
they meet DOD enlistment standards and also complete their obligated service.  
“You recruit who you are” describes this relationship. Here is a possibility—that 
the Marine recruiter’s quality affects the quality of enlistee who they attract and contract. 
This possibility means that a HQ recruiter will find, attract, and contract a HQ enlistee. 
This research seeks to fill this gap and explore the possibility that HQ recruiters attract HQ 
enlistees. In order to evaluate this relationship, quality must be defined and measured. 
Fortunately, some of the literature evaluates measures of quality and these measures will 
be used within this research. 
A. MARKET CONDITIONS 
Some of the existing literature focuses on market conditions as determinants of 
recruiter success. Sanchez (2018) studied individuals who joined the Marine Corps from 
2007 to 2017, which consisted of 344,469 enlistments, 132 recruiter months, and 528 
recruiter years to determine the optimal number of recruiters while also evaluating market 
conditions. Sanchez recommends increasing the quantity of recruiters per RS to provide 
additional contracts due to the anticipated shortage of qualified applicants in the future and 
unfavorable market conditions. These recommendations assume that market conditions, 
specifically the low unemployment rate, will continue indefinitely. Though unforeseen, the 
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unemployment rate increased dramatically in 2020 due to COVID-19. Sanchez 
recommends uniformly increasing the quantity of recruiters though he describes a 
recruiting market that is not uniform. If each RS has different quality markets, the Marine 
Corps ostensibly will implement a targeted approach, not a uniform policy.  
The premise of Sanchez’s research assumes that each market has different quality, 
and some markets are “saturated” or easier to recruit within than others due to higher 
market population, higher-quality per capita market, and higher propensity to enlist. 
Although the estimates were statistically insignificant, the author infers a generalization 
that recruiters in saturated markets have a higher probability of contracting quality 
applicants and enlistments in general. The author attributes this generalization due to the 
lack of observed effort of the recruiter. Furthermore, the interpretation that some recruiters 
may contract enlistees with less effort compared to their peers in other markets ignores the 
effect of the recruiter’s quality on the enlistee (Sanchez, 2018). 
Dertouzos and Garber (2006) reach a similar conclusion about unobserved 
characteristics. They analyze the productivity of Army recruiters from 1998 to 2000. Their 
research consists of monthly observations for more than 10,000 recruiters and 130,000 
observations on recruiter-month pairs. The research details characteristics of successful 
recruiters and how their productivity relates to the market characteristics where assigned. 
They also find that the recruiter’s AFQT and level of education has no measured impact 
on their productivity. Using fixed effects, the authors also suppose four unmeasured 
attributes account for more variation than the observed characteristics: (1) talent for selling; 
(2) motivation; (3) energy; and (4) time-management. 
Dertouzos and Garber also consider the market conditions for success with Army 
recruiting. They conclude inequities (such as higher propensity to enlist or higher-quality 
individuals) exist among markets and recommend adjusting the mission for higher-quality 
markets to improve the equity as determined by their standard model. They also used 
recruiting station fixed effects with 1,600 separate variables to measure variation within 
stations and remove market characteristics. Importantly, this study analyzes Army 
recruiting and so applicability to the Marine Corps equitable recruiting model is limited. 
Unlike the Army, the Marine Corps does not assign missions to recruiters based on their 
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market and instead allocates boundaries to create equitable markets, so all recruiters are 
expected to similarly perform (Dertouzos & Garber, 2006). 
Davin and Tomlinson (2009) attempt to further develop and refine a model to 
forecast, at the RSS level, the supply of HQ male contracts. They looked at data for the 
RSS-level recruiter contract and population from October 2002 to June 2007. At the county 
level, they evaluate data such as the unemployment rate and civilian youth population data 
and, at the state level, they evaluate veteran population and civilian wage data. They use 
fixed effects at the RSS level and determine the effects for recruiters, unemployment rate, 
military-to-civilian pay elasticity, other-service recruiters, and veteran population 
elasticity. Even though they use fixed effects at the RSS level, they still control for effects 
in the local market such as other service recruiters, youth population, the unemployment 
rate, and military-to-civilian pay ratio. For robustness, they calculated the same model 
without fixed effects. Through all their models, they found that an increase in the number 
of Marine recruiters resulted in an increase in the number of HQ male contracts. They also 
found that the local unemployment rate most affected the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimate. They used veteran population as a proxy for propensity to enlist because this 
metric is unobserved, though the results were not statistically significant. Because this 
research focused on the market conditions, they did not focus on any aspects of recruiter 
quality (Davin & Tomlinson, 2009). Plantz (2000) also found the county demographic 
variables including unemployment rate, population, and per capita income significant to 
Marine recruiting. 
B. QUALITY: RECRUITER AND ENLISTEE 
In addition to market conditions, some research looks at the quality of the enlistee 
or recruiter. However, the term quality is often used in a haphazard manner without clarity 
of meaning. Sanchez (2018) recommends implementing an assessment tool that would 
allow leaders to identify Marines with innate sales skills (salesmanship) with the 
expectation that these Marines would perform well in recruiting. The study does not 
provide any evidence that this is measurable or how well this predicts HQ contracts, and 
this seems based on their intuition. Throughout Sanchez’s research, they use the term 
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quality without definition. Quality is initially assumed to consist of applicants who possess 
Tier I education and a Category IIIA or higher (Alpha) on the AFQT. However, Sanchez 
then uses the term quality to refer to recruiters who have more skill in communication, 
salesmanship, soft-skills, and also character and competence (Sanchez, 2018).  
Similar to Sanchez, much of the other research references AFQT and education tier 
when using the term quality. For example, Hosek et al. (2018) studies military and civilian 
pay levels, trends, and recruit quality. Specific to recruit quality, they categorize quality by 
AFQT score category (I, II, IIIA, and IIIB) and HS graduate.  
Other research defines quality specific to reenlistment. Crider (2015) evaluates the 
Marine Corps tiered evaluated system for reenlistment based on the fact that the majority 
of research for retention focuses on incentives and not how quality individuals are 
identified. While analyzing first term Marine reenlistments from FY 2000–2012 and 
observing them through their next enlistment term, Crider finds that the tiered system is 
valid and identifies the highest-quality individuals. To determine the quality of the 
individual, the tiered system utilizes the PFT score, CFT score, proficiency and conduct 
marks, the rifle score, the MCMAP belt attained and whether an individual received a 
meritorious promotion to their current grade. The top two tiers represent the top 40% of 
Marines with four total tiers. They evaluate the Marine’s placement in tiers and their 
corresponding promotion speed (months until promotion to E6 and E7), career longevity, 
sustained physical performance (later PFT score) and performance evaluation as measured 
by scoring above the cumulative average for FITREPs. Crider finds that the tiered 
evaluation system is a good predictor of future outcomes such as promotion speed, career 
longevity, and sustained performance through FITREPs. Crider concludes the tiered 
evaluation system is therefore a good measure of quality. Although Crider evaluates 
promotion speed as a measure of quality, he measures promotion speed across all MOS. 
Enlisted Marines promote within MOS against their peers and my research will utilize this 
better approach. Additionally, instead of using a future PFT score to demonstrate sustained 
physical performance, using an average of the PFT scores and CFT scores in service better 
represent this consistency than a single score (Crider, 2015).  
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Quality of employees within civil service is measured using proxies for quality. 
Asch (2001) evaluates the pay, promotion, and retention of HQ civil service workers in the 
DOD using a longitudinal study spanning FY82 to FY96. Asch specifies, Q, at time, t, as 
a function of education, motivation, ability, and job factors (2001, p. 5):  
Qt = Q(education, motivation, ability, job factors)  
Asch relates the quality of the individual to their productivity in the workplace and, 
in this way, she provides value to the organization. Because some of these factors are 
unobserved, Asch defines quality using three measures as proxies: supervisor rating, level 
of education on entering the DOD, and promotion speed. Asch describes the measurement 
errors within education level and admits biased estimates when evaluating higher educated 
individuals’ compensation, retention, and promotion rates; however, this measurement 
error is likely random and thus reduces the magnitude toward zero. Asch uses promotion 
speed for her analysis though, for those who exit service, this measure will not accurately 
describe their quality. Because of the aforementioned biases, Asch focuses on the direction 
of the results and less so on the magnitude (Asch, 2001).  
Some of the research explores interaction effects and matching of the recruiter to 
the enlistee. Oh (2013) examines whether a gender, racial or ethnic interaction effect exists 
between the Navy recruiter and enlistee and the resulting effect on quality of the applicant. 
Oh recognizes that there is no statistically significant relationship based on the recruiter-
enlistee match for gender, race, or ethnicity, but does acknowledges that further research 
should explore the individual characteristics or abilities of recruiters (p. 45). Oh finds that 
male recruiters are more likely to recruit Category Alpha (above 50 on the AFQT) 
applicants though females are more likely to recruit an individual who does not attrite 
during their first 12 months. Oh finds no consistent result with positive outcomes for HQ 
applicants with the same race or ethnicity of the recruiter. Oh uses six separate measures 
to define quality and separates them into two categories: measurable prior to enlistment 
and measurable during their military service. Prior to military service, they use AFQT 
percentile, whether an individual is a high school graduate, and whether they are an Alpha. 
For military service, Oh specifies quality as individuals who do not attrite: attrite from 
active duty within 12 months; between 13 to 24 months; and between 25 to 45 months. 
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Unfortunately, Oh does not measure the individual’s performance in service by focusing 
only on attrition (Oh, 2013).  
Other research explores recruiter individual personal characteristics and their 
effects on productivity. Plantz (2000) analyzed the effects of personal background 
characteristics for recruiters and market demographics on the recruiter’s productivity using 
data on Navy and Marine recruiters assigned to recruiting duty from 1995 to 1999. Plantz 
found that both age and paygrade significantly affected monthly production with younger 
and lower ranking recruiters outperforming their counterparts. Race and ethnicity were 
found statistically insignificant when measuring background characteristics and their effect 
on recruiter productivity in the Marine Corps though both variables were statistically 
significant for Navy recruiting during the same period (Plantz, 200). Similarly to the effect 
of race and ethnicity for Navy recruiting in Plantz’s study, Dertouzos and Garber (2006) 
find that black Army recruiters are more productive in market areas with where black 
demographics are more predominant among the youth and females are more effective at 
recruiting females. The researchers also discover that Army recruiters with certain MOSs 
(technical, combat, and intelligence) and younger recruiters are more productive than their 
counterparts. Additional considerations include assignment to home state which increases 
the productivity of the Army recruiter (Dertouzos & Garber, 2006).  
Much of the research on enlistee quality focuses on attrition. Marrone (2020) 
predicts 36-month attrition on average in the military across services. Marrone describes 
the importance of identifying individuals who will serve out their term and not attrite to 
maintain the readiness of the force. Marrone studies attrition as a qualifier for HQ 
individuals since attrition is costly at $11,000 per enlistment in the Marine Corps (2020, p. 
1). Malone et al. (2011) researched waivered enlistees and their performance and attrition 
risk. They find that waivered servicemembers are more likely to be male, older, and Tier 
II education credential (lack HS diploma) and come from the specific regions of the United 
States region (East North Central) compared to their counterparts. Malone et al. find that 
waivered enlistees attrite at lower rates than Tier II/III enlistees.  
More relevant to this research, Malone also evaluates the performance of the 
waivered individuals relative to non-waivered individuals. They use time to promotion to 
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E5 to define HQ though they only select eight MOSs within the Marine Corps (0121, 0151, 
0311, 0621, 1371, 2844, 3521, and 3531) (Malone et al. 2011, p. 97). It is assumed they 
chose these MOSs as representative of the Marine Corps. They calculate the promotion 
time within these MOS and characterize them as fast promoting if they promote in the first 
25% of their MOS accession cohort based on their accession year. Since they did not 
include all MOSs, even though some are small, their results are not robust. For example, 
out of the eight MOS, one is combat arms (infantry), one is combat support (combat 
engineer), and the rest are combat service support. With two of the eight from motor 
transport (3521, 3531) and two from administration (0121, 0151), much of the Marine 
Corps was excluded in their model and they likely introduced bias since certain MOSs not 
included may promote slower on average than those included. The authors conclude that 
many waivered recruits become HQ servicemembers and therefore define quality as 
promotion ahead of peers to E5 (Malone et al. 2011, p. 65). Because quality has different 
meanings based on the application, my research will define this term in detail before 
introduction into the metrics. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Within this chapter, I first describe the various data sources used in this research. 
Second, in order to define quality, I describe and use multiple pre-defined standards to 
establish five metrics to categorize enlistees and recruiters as HQ or not. Third, I detail the 
various issues I encountered with the data and describe my remedies. Fourth, I provide 
summary statistics for the enlistees and recruiters. Within the methodology section, I 
describe the single final model used to estimate the relationship between the HQ recruiter 
and HQ enlistee metrics based on five separate metrics. I use OLS LPM regressions with 
the defined HQ enlistee dichotomous dependent variables and the defined HQ recruiter as 
the dichotomous explanatory variables. 
A. DATA 
1. Data Sources 
I focus on enlisted personnel who shipped to recruit training from 2011 to 2019. In 
total, the useable data set consists of 264,681 enlistees and 12,125 recruiters for 264,681 
recruiter-enlistee pairs. Multiple groups of enlistees were dropped from the useable data 
set for various reasons. First, only enlistees who started service (date of enlistment) January 
1, 2011 were included. Additionally, this data set does not include those enlistees missing 
their recruiter’s EDIPI (7,451) since they could not be paired with a recruiter. 
Although I could have excluded enlistees who shipped after 2015 to ensure each 
enlistee would have four years of observed service (if they did not attrite), the recruiter data 
for enlistees between 2011 to 2015 was less complete than the data from recruiters later 
within the decade. I determine that including the more recent population would provide a 
larger sample with more complete data and thereby increase the recruiter-enlistee pairs 
resulting in more robust results. Similarly, the recruiter pool is limited to those recruiters 
who contracted the enlistees between this period of 2011 to 2019.  
Data for this research was provided by the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW), 
Marine Corps Recruiting Information Support System (MCRISS), and the Performance 
Evaluation Section (MMRP-30). TFDW data consisted of pooled (PFT, CFT, rifle scores, 
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promotions, and dates of rank) and cross-sectional performance data for both recruiters and 
enlistees. The pooled data covered 2011 to 2019 for enlistees and all years prior to 2019 
for the recruiters. The MCRISS data included cross-sectional data for both the enlistees 
and recruiters at the time of their enlistment. The MMRP-30 pooled data consisted of 
fitness reports (performance evaluations) for each of the recruiters beginning at grade E-5 
and ending when the recruiter attended the BRC. The data from the various sources were 
merged using the Electronic Data Interchange Personnel Identifier (EDIPI) for both the 
recruiters and the enlistees. The recruiter and enlistee data were merged using the enlistee 
MCRISS data that includes their recruiter EDIPI. 
The MCRISS data provided entry level information such as education tier, AFQT 
score, height and weight at contract, District, RS, RSS, initial strength test (IST) results, 
delayed entry program (DEP) discharge information, and demographics. The TFDW data 
included:  
• performance evaluation information (average enlistment proficiency 
and conduct marks), 
• demographic information, 
• primary MOS, 
• duty status; education, 
• religion, 
• marital status, 
• number of dependents, 
• unit assigned (Reporting Unit Code or RUC), 
• number of assignments to weight control (Body Composition Program 
or BCP), 
• PFT information such as date, class, score, and individual events, 
• CFT information such as date; class, score, and individual events, 
• an individual’s home of record city, county, and state, 
• ranks promoted to and the corresponding date of rank, 
• enlistment waiver information, 
• awards received by date and type, and  
• separation information including the date, narrative, and 
characterization of the separation 
The MMRP-30 data included all of the recruiters individual FITREPs though I only 
evaluated FITREPs prior to the Marine attending the BRC. The FITREP data provided the 
relative value for each of the fitness reports and the cumulative relative value over time.  
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2. Limitations 
The number of observations for each metric varies since some of the metrics require 
more data than others. As a result, some of the metrics exclude individuals that are missing 
components of the metric. As a first example, Metric 1 is based on accession standards so 
there are more observations within this metric since it includes individuals that attrite in 
the DEP or in recruit training. Because these individuals will not receive proficiency and 
conduct marks, they will not have scores for Metrics 2–4. I choose to include these 
individuals that attrite within the Model because this Model is focused on the existing DOD 
enlistment standards which do not consider attrition (only AFQT and a high school 
diploma). Therefore, Metrics 2–4 will have fewer observations than Metric 1 for enlistees. 
As a sidenote, for the individuals that attrite in the DEP and lack a ship date, I truncated 
them based on their contract date or date of enlistment. As a second example, Metric 3 and 
4 require the MCMAP belt as a component for the score, and enlistees and recruiters that 
lack the MCMAP belt data are excluded, resulting in fewer observations compared with 
Metric 2. 
The recruiter data spans a significant period depending on the time in service when 
the recruiter attended the BRC. For example, a Marine Sergeant may attend at their five-
year mark or a Gunnery Sergeant may attend at their 15-year mark. Because scores are 
calculated as the average over their service, a Gunnery Sergeant will have many more 
PFTs, CFTs, rifle scores, a higher MCMAP belt most likely, and more observed fitness 
reports than the junior sergeant who attends at their five-year mark. Evaluating the Sergeant 
and the Gunnery Sergeant in the same manner provides an apple to oranges comparison. 
However, some of the scores are constrained to below the rank E5. For example, the 
proficiency and conduct marks are given until a Marine promotes to E5, so these 
comparisons are more similar between higher and lower ranking Marine recruiters. Also, 
by using the average scores for PFT, CFT and rifle as opposed to their most recent score, I 
limit the effects of this bias since Marines will have to demonstrate sustained performance 
to be categorized as HQ. 
Similar to the differences in rank for recruiters, the observed time for the enlistees 
differs. Because the data is cutoff by years of service, some enlistees may only have one 
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year in service while others who reenlisted may potentially have eight years of service. 
Although some of the characteristics of the metrics are limited by rank (such as proficiency 
and conduct marks), other characteristics may provide an advantage to those with more 
years of service. For example, a Marine with six years of service will likely have more 
opportunities to advance within the MCMAP than a Marine with only two years of service 
and therefore Marines with more years of service may have higher-quality scores within 
the metrics. A different example includes promotion to E5. Because the previous service 
policy restricts promotions to E5 prior to 24 months of service, those individuals with less 
than two years or service will not have the opportunity to promote to E5. Of note, recently 
the policy changed to require 48 months of service prior to promotion to E5. 
HQ recruiters are categorized by the different metrics against their peers who are 
other recruiters. However, the enlistees are compared against all other enlistees. If a certain 
quality (low or high) Marine generally volunteers or receives assignment to recruiting duty, 
then the recruiters within this study may not represent the overall population of enlisted 
Marines. Also, because the enlistees and recruiters are compared against their peers, the 
results do not include differences between accession years or year the recruiter started 
recruiting and the Marines are evaluated against either all enlistees or all recruiters. As an 
aside, the metrics focus on HQ as defined and not low-quality. Of note, although the Marine 
Corps should evaluate the effect of low-quality recruiters on both low-quality enlistees and 
high-quality enlistees, these relationships exceed the scope of this research.  
Recruiters may have some ability to self-select which RS they go to if they are a 
HQ recruiter. Because the assignment of a recruiter to an RS is dependent on the recruiter 
determining which RS they wish to receive assignment to and contacting the respective RS 
SgtMaj, they have some influence in where they are assigned. Further, because the RS 
SgtMaj has considerable power in determining which recruiters who request “by-name” 
assignment to their RS receive orders, it is expected that higher-quality Marine recruiters 
will have an advantage over lower-quality recruiters with assignment since the RS SgtMaj 
will screen them and select their top choices. If the recruiter views a certain RS market as 
easier or higher-quality and self-selects to that RS, they may be able to influence how many 
HQ enlistees they contract but only if they are placed in an RSS that is easier or higher-
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quality. Importantly, as described in Chapter II, Part B, the RS SgtMaj assigns recruiters 
to the RSS based on vacancies and markets vary significantly between RSS within the RS. 
I use RSS fixed effects to attempt to remove this bias from the model. Additionally, 
assignment to recruiting duty is either through volunteering or involuntary assignment. 
Within this research, I am unable to differentiate between volunteers and those individuals 
who were directed to attend the Basic Recruiting Course.  
Enlistees who have graduated high school are not restricted to a specific recruiter, 
whereas enlistees still enrolled in high school must contract with the recruiter assigned to 
that specific sector. As a result, if recruiter A encounters an applicant who is assigned to 
recruiter B’s high school, then recruiter A must pass the applicant on to recruiter B. For 
those enlistees who have graduated, similarities between them and the recruiter may have 
a more pronounced effect since the enlistee can effectively “choose” the recruiter who they 
contract with, but the high schooler cannot. 
Finally, the method used to determine this relationship, the OLS LPM, adds 
additional limitations to this research. Because the LPM assumes the probability falls 
within 0 to 1 and a skew could influence the results, I conduct logistic regression robustness 
checks to demonstrate the validity of the LPM. Also, because of the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity, I include robust standard errors. 
3. Metrics Used to Define and Measure Quality 
In order to measure the quality of the Marine recruiter and enlistee, it is necessary 
to first define quality. Because quality lacks a standardized definition within the Marine 
Corps, quality can assume multiple meanings and proves difficult to measure. This research 
uses existing standards to define quality and evaluate the quality relationship between the 
Marine recruiter and enlistee within those methods. The existing methods include: 
• DOD enlistment standards (Metric 1),  
• the legacy promotion composite score (Metric 2)  
• the new junior enlisted promotion evaluation score (JEPES) system 
(Metric 3),  
• the reenlistment evaluation tier method (Metric 4),  
• the enlistee promotion speed to E5 (enlistee Metric 5), and 
• the recruiter FITREP performance evaluations (recruiter Metric 5)  
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Figure 6 provides an overview of the components for each of the metrics. For 
Metric 1, individuals are determined as HQ if they meet the established criteria. For Metrics 
2–4, if individuals possess scores above the 60th percentile for their peer group (either 
recruiters or enlistees), then they are considered HQ. I use a tier system based on the four 
tiers used within the reenlistment tier evaluation and, as Crider (2015, p. 64) concluded, 
the reenlistment tier evaluation system is a good measure of quality for the Marine. Because 
the Marine Corps labels the top two tiers as “eminently qualified” and “competitively 
qualified,” these individuals are considered HQ individuals. Tier I is the 90th percentile and 
Tier II is the 60th percentile. In Metric 5, enlistees who were the first 25% to promote to E5 
are considered HQ and recruiters with cumulative relative values above 90 (scored above 
their peers) are considered HQ.  
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Figure 6. Five Metrics that Define HQ for Recruiters and Enlistees  
 













% of Total 
Possible 
Score
Physical Fitness Test Score* 167 11%
Combat Fitness Test Score* 167 11%
Rifle Score (Table I) * 167 11%
Proficiency Marks Average 500 33%





% of Total 
Possible 
Score
Physical Fitness Test Score (Physical Toughness) 125 13%
Combat Fitness Test Score (Physical Toughness) 125 13%
Rifle Score (Table I&II) (Warfighting) 125 13%
Martial Arts Belt Score (Warfighting) 125 13%
AFQT Score (Mental Agility Proxy) 250 25%






*General Military Proficiency is the average of the scaled PFT, CFT, and Rifle 









Total score is comprised of four equally weighted pillars: Physical Toughness, 
Warfighting, Mental Agility, and Command Input. Each of the individual scores 
is scaled.
Physical Fitness Test Score*
Combat Fitness Test Score*
Rifle Score (Table I) *
Proficiency Marks Average
Conduct Marks Average
Physical Fitness Test Score (Physical Toughness)
Combat Fitness Test Score (Physical Toughness)
Rifle Score (Table I&II) (Warfighting)
Martial Arts Belt Score (Warfighting)
AFQT Score (Mental Agility Proxy)
Proficiency & Conduct Marks (Command Input Proxy)
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Figure 6 cont’d.  Five Metrics that Define HQ for Recruiters and Enlistees 
 
 






% of Total 
Possible 
Score
Proficiency Marks Average 500 23%
Conduct Marks Average 500 23%
Rifle Score (Table I & II) 350 16%
Physical Fitness Test Score 300 14%
Combat Fitness Test Score 300 14%
Martial Arts Belt Scaled Score 100 5%
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Rifle Score (Table I & II)
Physical Fitness Test Score
Combat Fitness Test Score
Martial Arts Belt Scaled Score
Meritorious Promotion
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These different metrics of quality provide the foundation for the model I use to 
estimate the effect of the HQ recruiter on the HQ enlistee discussed in Part B of this chapter. 
Once I determine HQ using Metrics 1–5, I determine whether Marines are consistently 
identified as HQ across all metrics. As depicted in Table 3, Metrics 2–4 are closely related, 
with correlation coefficients above 0.5, and Metrics 1 and 5 are not as closely related to the 
other metrics, with correlation coefficients below 0.30. 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix for Metrics that Define HQ 
           
Enlistee Metrics 
  HQE1 HQE2 HQE3 HQE4 HQE5 
HQE1      
HQE2 0.05     
HQE3 0.22 0.56    
HQE4 0.01 0.64 0.60   
HQE5 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.15  
Recruiter Metrics 
  HQR1 HQR2 HQR3 HQR4 HQR5 
HQR1      
HQR2 0.10     
HQR3 0.25 0.58    
HQR4 0.07 0.73 0.71   
HQR5 0.06 0.26 0.25 0.27  
 
a. Metric 1: DOD Enlistment Standards 
Based on the DOD enlistment standards, I infer that the DOD defines quality for an 
enlistee as someone who scores at or above 50 on the AFQT and possesses a high school 
diploma and this definition, therefore, forms the basis for the first metric. The Department 
of Defense Instruction (2013) establishes requirements for the services regarding quality 
distribution of manpower accessions. The qualitative distribution is defined as “the 
proportion (distribution) of two key characteristics or qualities, aptitude and education 
status, of accessions within a particular fiscal year” (DODINST 1145.01, 2020, p. 6). 
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Consequently, the qualitative distribution is comprised of the Armed Forces Qualification 
Test (AFQT) based on five categories and three education tiers as depicted in Table 4.  
Table 4. DOD Qualitative Distribution: AFQT and Education. Adapted 
from DODINST 1145.01 (2020). 
            
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)   Education Credential Tiers 
Category Percentile Score   Tier Priority Description 
I  93-99   
I High 
HS Graduates, college 
degree holders or some 
college credits, and 
covered graduates 
      
II 65-92   
      
IIIA 50-64   
            
IIIB 41-49   II Medium Alternative credential holders 
            
IV 10-30   
III Low 
Nongraduates with 
AFQT scores at or 
above 31st percentile 
(Category IIIB) 
      
V 1-9   
The AFQT is broken into five categories with category III broken into two sub-categories all based on AFQT 
percentile score. Those above a 50 are referred to as Category III “Alphas” and those scoring below 50 are 
referred to as “Bravos.” Education is broken into three tiers based on high school diploma status. 
The DOD prescribes benchmarks for the services that include 60% of accessions at 
or above the 50th percentile (Category IIIA, II, and I) and 90% with education credentials 
Tier I (DODINST 1145.01, 2020). A quality individual using this metric will score above 
a 50 on the AFQT and be Tier I for education credentials. 
For Metric 1, I use these established DOD standards for HQ in Equation 1. 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 1 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 ≥ 50) & (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼) (1) 
where the HQE1 equal 1 if the enlistee is determined HQ and 0 otherwise and HQR1 equal 
1 if the recruiters is determined HQ and 0 otherwise. The enlistee and recruiter are 
considered HQ if they graduated from high school (education tier I) and possess an AFQT 
score greater than or equal to 50. Table 5 depicts the components of Metric 1 and output. 
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Table 5. Metric 1 Components and Output 
           
            
Enlistee  
   N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Education Tier 264,354 1.00 0.04 1.00 2.00 
AFQT Score 264,354 61.66 17.72 0.00 99.00 
HQE1 264,354 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Recruiter  
   N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Education Tier 11,876 1.02 0.15 1.00 3.00 
AFQT Score 11,876 59.36 17.54 21.00 99.00 
HQR1 11,876 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 
 
b. Metric 2: Marine Corps Enlisted Promotion Composite Scores (Legacy 
System) 
The Marine Corps uses the promotion composite score system to rank Marines in 
grades E3 and E4 and determine who is best qualified for promotion. This scoring system 
provides the basis for the second metric. I will calculate promotion composite scores for 
each of the Marine recruiters and enlistees to rank them against their peers. Although the 
Marine Corps is presently replacing the legacy system with the Junior Enlisted 
Performance Evaluation System (JEPES), because this system was used during the 
observed period between 2011 to 2019, it is included as a metric.  
The promotion scoring system is unique to E4 and E5 since regular promotions to 
E2 and E3 are based solely on time with promotions to E6 and higher using a promotion 
board system. Each quarter, E3 and E4 Marines receive a newly computed promotion 
composite score if they are eligible for promotion. The Marine Corps uses these composite 
scores to determine the cut score that determines promotions within a specific MOS (based 
on the requirement). All of the Marines possessing a composite score above the cut receive 
promotions. For the following months in the quarter, the Marine Corps could lower the cut 
score to promote more Marines or close the promotions based on the requirement. The 
Marine Corps Promotion Manual for Enlisted Promotions outlines this computation using 
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several measures including their rifle marksmanship score, physical fitness score, average 
proficiency marks, average conduct marks, time in grade, time in service, bonus points for 
volunteering to serve in a special duty assignment, education points for continuing 
education through the service or civilian education, and additional bonus points awarded 
for recruiting an individual who enlists. The computation as outlined in the Marine Corps 
Promotion Manual, Volume II, Enlisted Promotions (Headquarters, United States Marine 
Corps, 2006, p. 57) follows. I exclude Lines 9 to 13 and intentionally marked them out 
since they are not included in this metric. Lines 9 and 10 are awarded based on tenure 
alone. Line 11 is due to opportunities that not all Marines may have since a HQ Marine 
may only serve four years of honorable service and not attend DI, Recruiter, or MSG 
school. Line 12 is not observed since this score would normally include MarineNet courses 
and college courses completed. Line 13 is also not observed. 
Line No.         Rating  
1. Rifle Marksmanship Score    = _____ 
2. Physical Fitness Score    = _____ 
3. Combat Fitness Test    = _____ 
4. Subtotal (line 1 + 2 + 3)       = _____  
5. General Military Proficiency Score (line 3 divided by 2)  = _____ 
6. General Military Proficiency Score (from line 4) x 100   = _____  
7. Average Duty Proficiency x 100     = _____ 
8. Average Conduct x 100       = _____  
9. Time in Grade (months)       = _____  
10. Time in Service (months)      = _____   
11. DI/Recruiter/MSG Bonus (maximum 100 points)  = _____  
12. Self-Education Bonus: (maximum 100 points)  
13. Command Recruiting Bonus: (maximum 100 points)  = _____  
14. Composite Score (sum of lines 6 through 13)    = _____ 
In order to compute the composite score, many of the individual scores are 
converted to a 0.0 to a 5.0 scaled system as depicted in Table 6. For the Line 1 rifle score, 
the score was converted from the three-digit score to a rating between 0.0 to 5.0 with the 
highest individuals scoring between a 240–250 and the lowest unqualifying with a score 
between 0–189. For the requalification or sustainment course, the scoring is different 
spanning 0 to 65 with a 5.0 awarded to scoring 57 to 65 and 0 awarded to scoring less than 
24. Also, important to note, these scores are based only on the Table I course of fire (known 
distance course) and do not include Table II. Many rifle scores include both Table I and 
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Table II and are thus out of a 350-point maximum vice the 250-point maximum depicted 
here. 
Table 6. Rifle Conversion Table. Source: Headquarters, United States 
Marine Corps (2006). 
 
Lines 2 and 3 cover the Physical Fitness Test (PFT) and Combat Fitness Test (CFT) 
that each consist of a score between 0 to 300 for their respective three events. The Marine 
Corps MARADMIN 587/18 (2018) changed the scoring for both the CFT and PFT by 
standardizing the conversions between the two tests across all age groups as depicted in 
Table 7. Scoring a 300 on either test results in a 5.0 with a 4.9 awarded for scoring between 
287 to 299. For those that score below a 150 and fail, they receive a 0.  
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Table 7. Physical Fitness Test and Combat Fitness Test Scoring. 
Adapted from Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (2018). 
      
Class Score Rating 
1st 300 5.0 
  287-299 4.9 
  274-286 4.8 
  261-273 4.7 
  248-260 4.6 
  235-247 4.5 
2nd 228-234 4.4 
  221-227 4.3 
  214-220 4.2 
  207-213 4.1 
  200-206 4.0 
3rd 190-199 3.9 
  180-189 3.8 
  170-179 3.7 
  160-169 3.6 
  150-159 3.5 
Unqualified 0-149 0.0 
 
The rifle score, PFT, and CFT rating are averaged to form the General Military 
Proficiency (GMP) score on Line 5 and then multiplied by 100 to generate line 6. Line 7 
and Line 8 include the Average Duty Proficiency and Average Duty Conduct scores. Both 
of these scores are rated on a 0.0–5.0 scale and multiplied by 100. An average Marine is 
considered between a 4.0 to a 4.4 for both proficiency and conduct marks.  
The resulting Line 14 provides the Marine’s individually calculated composite 
score for that quarter. Because the promotion system is a means to identify, retain, and 
grow talent, the composite score provides a metric for determining quality individuals. 
Additionally, because all Marines who receive assignment to recruiting duty have 
promoted beyond these ranks and Marines who complete their first enlistment will also 
have received a composite score, the composite score provides the second metric for 
quality. The calculated composite score will rank Marines against their peers based on their 
scores. 
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For Metric 2, I use these the legacy promotion composite score standards for HQ 
to determine whether the recruiter and enlistee are HQ. The Metric 2 score was computed 
as depicted in Equation 2. 
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸2𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
3
+ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (2) 
The enlistee and recruiter scores for the PFT, CFT, and Table 1 rifle score were 
averaged across their service (recruiters prior to attending the BRC) and then the average 
scores were converted to a 5.0 scale. The average proficiency marks and conduct marks 
were multiplied by 10 for a maximum 500 points. Table 8 depicts the different components 
of Metric 2. 
The enlistee and recruiter are considered HQ if they exceed the 60th percentile for 
their composite score which is the Tier II. I use this cutoff that determines Marines above 
the 60th percentile as high-quality based on the reenlistment tier evaluation system 
discussed later within this chapter. Tier I is the 90th percentile. Equation 3 depicts the 
quality relationship between Marine recruiter and enlistee according to Metric 2. 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸2𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ≥  𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸2𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃60  (3) 
where HQE2 or HQR2 equal 1 if the Metric2Score is above the 60th percentile for their 




Table 8. Metric 2 Components and Tiers 
            
Enlistee  
   N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Physical Fitness Test Average 240,212 242.21 35.44 23 300 
Physical Fitness Test Average Scaled 240,212 4.38 0.77 0 5 
Combat Fitness Test Average 240,212 272.56 25.02 37 300 
Combat Fitness Test Average Scaled 240,212 4.72 0.38 0 5 
Rifle Score Table I Average 240,212 214.30 11.38 21 250 
Rifle Score Table I Average Scaled 240,212 4.16 0.69 0 5 
Proficiency Marks Average  240,212 43.15 1.68 2 50 
Proficiency Marks Average Scaled 240,212 431.53 16.80 20 500 
Conduct Marks Average 240,212 43.00 1.90 4 50 
Conduct Marks Average Scaled 240,212 430.01 19.00 40 500 
Metric 2 Score 240,212 1303.21 59.48 507 1497 
Metric 2 Tier I Cutoff 240,212 1360.00 0.00 1360 1360 
Metric 2 Tier II Cutoff 240,212 1323.33 0.00 1323 1323 
HQE2 240,212 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Recruiter  
   N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Physical Fitness Test Average 7,979 250.81 27.53 97 300 
Physical Fitness Test Average Scaled 7,979 4.53 0.39 0 5 
Combat Fitness Test Average 7,979 268.04 29.25 70 300 
Combat Fitness Test Average Scaled 7,979 4.65 0.55 0 5 
Rifle Score Table I Average 7,979 217.99 9.58 152 248 
Rifle Score Table I Average Scaled 7,979 4.35 0.48 0 5 
Proficiency Marks Average  7,979 44.89 0.94 41 49 
Proficiency Marks Average Scaled 7,979 448.87 9.41 410 490 
Conduct Marks Average 7,979 44.87 0.99 39 49 
Conduct Marks Average Scaled 7,979 448.66 9.92 390 490 
Metric 2 Score 7,979 1348.70 35.77 1017 1443 
Metric 2 Tier I Cutoff 7,979 1386.67 0.00 1387 1387 
Metric 2 Tier II Cutoff 7,979 1360.00 0.00 1360 1360 




c. Metric 3: Junior Enlisted Performance Evaluation System (JEPES)  
The third metric used within this research to measure quality of the Marine recruiter 
and enlistee is the JEPES. This new system will replace, by February 1, 2021, the legacy 
composite score method as the new evaluation system used to determine which grade E3 
and E4 Marines receive promotion. The JEPES consists of a maximum 1,000 points 
consisting of four equal “pillars” worth up to 250 points each: warfighting, physical 
toughness, mental agility, and command input. The first three pillars are described by the 
Marine Corps as objective measurements and the Marine will be able to see their ranking 
against their peers through the online portal. The combined score for the four pillars is 
referred to as the Performance Evaluation System (PES) Score.  
Although the system is automated within Marine Online, the Marine can use a 
worksheet to determine their individual score. The worksheet depicted in Table 9 shows 
the breakdown between the different scores and how they are computed (Headquarters, 
United States Marine Corps, 2020b).  
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Table 9. JEPES Manual Scoring Worksheet. Source:  Headquarters, United 




The first pillar is warfighting and includes the rifle score and belt level attained 
within the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP). Depending on the MCMAP 
belt and potential instructor credentials, the Marine can receive additional points. Marines 
receive a tan belt during recruit training and can continue the MCMAP throughout their 
careers while progressing through gray, green, brown, and various black belt levels. The 
individual uses the scoring worksheet in addition to scoring tables for the MCMAP belt 
depicted in Table 10 to determine the value based on the highest MCMAP belt attained. 
Table 10. JEPES MCMAP Belt Scoring. Source:  Headquarters, United 
States Marine Corps (2020b). 
 
 
The second pillar, physical toughness, includes the PFT and CFT. Both the 
warfighting and physical toughness pillars use a relative scoring system that provides 
points based on their standing against their peers. Based on their peer’s percentile, they are 
awarded the same level of points such as 88th percentile would award 88 points. The total 
points in each of these two pillars is multiplied by 1.25 for up to 250 points each 
(Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2020a). As depicted in Table 11, the Marine 
receives a specific value based on each of the three scores. 
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Table 11. JEPES PFT, CFT, and Rifle Scoring. Source:  Headquarters, 
United States Marine Corps (2020b). 
 
For the first two pillars, I calculate the scoring exactly how the JEPES is calculated 
except I use average scores in service for PFT, CFT, and rifle score. The JEPES would 
normally rely on the current score but by using an average I am including sustained 
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performance which will provide a more consistent result. For example, a Marine may 
typically score below a 250 on the PFT but while attending Corporals Course they may be 
in better shape and achieve a 280 PFT. By using their average score in service, I will 
“average out” these outliers. Of note, the MCMAP belt attained is the highest belt level the 
Marine achieved during their service.  
I will use proxies for both the third and fourth pillar. The third pillar provides up to 
250 points based on college degree attained, college courses completed and MarineNet 
courses completed though I will use AFQT as a proxy due to lack of observed data. The 
fourth pillar, command input, is a completely subjective measurement since the Marine’s 
leadership evaluates the Marine based on predetermined criteria. Since these scores have 
not yet been implemented, I use a combination of the proficiency marks and conduct marks 
as the proxy for this command input. Evaluation criteria includes performance within the 
Marine’s MOS, their contribution toward the mission, and their individual leadership and 
character. I multiply the proficiency and conduct marks by 1.25 to attain the 250-point 
maximum. The JEPES also provides the same bonuses that the legacy composite score 
provides though I do not include them because they are unobserved (Headquarters, United 
States Marine Corps, 2020a).  
For Metric 3, I use these the JEPES score to determine whether the recruiter and 
enlistee are HQ. The metric score is depicted in Equation 4. 
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸3𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = ��𝐽𝐽𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝐽𝐽𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃� ∗ 1.25�𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + [(𝐽𝐽𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 +
𝐽𝐽𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) ∗ 1.25]𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 + (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 ∗ 2.5)𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 +
[(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ∗ 2.5) + (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ∗ 2.5)]𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  (4) 
The enlistee and recruiter average scores for the PFT, CFT, and rifle score, and their 
MCMAP belt are converted to the JEPES 100-point scale. The sum of the four pillars is the 
Metric3Score. Similar to Metric 2, I use the 60th percentile as a cutoff for Tier II based on 
the reenlistment tier evaluation system discussed later within this chapter. The individual 
components of the score and tier cutoffs for Tier I and Tier II are listed in Table 12.  
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Table 12. Metric 3 Components and Tiers 
Enlistee  
   N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Rifle Score (Table I & II) Average 219,535 303.07 19.45 83 346 
Rifle Score (Table I & II) Average Scaled 219,535 38.18 25.25 0 100 
MCMAP Belt Score Scaled 219,535 42.60 27.04 0 100 
JEPES Warfighting Pillar 219,535 100.98 46.98 0 250 
Physical Fitness Test Average 219,535 242.05 35.47 23 300 
Physical Fitness Test Average Scaled 219,535 46.10 29.06 0 100 
Combat Fitness Test Average 219,535 271.54 25.39 37 300 
Combat Fitness Test Average Scaled 219,535 51.23 26.04 0 100 
JEPES Physical Toughness Pillar 219,535 121.66 60.54 0 250 
AFQT Score (as proxy) 219,535 61.98 17.71 0 99 
JEPES Mental Agility Pillar 219,535 154.96 44.29 0 248 
Proficiency Marks Average (as proxy) 219,535 43.22 1.53 2 50 
Conduct Marks Average (as proxy) 219,535 43.09 1.68 4 50 
JEPES Command Input Pillar 219,535 215.77 7.73 20 250 
Metric 3 Score 219,535 593.37 104.09 251 959 
Metric 3 Tier I Cutoff 219,535 732.50 0.00 733 733 
Metric 3 Tier II Cutoff 219,535 618.75 0.00 619 619 
HQE3 219,535 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Recruiter  
   N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Rifle Score (Table I & II) Average 7,812 307.86 16.77 144 348 
Rifle Score (Table I & II) Average Scaled 7,812 45.13 25.09 0 100 
MCMAP Belt Score Scaled 7,812 81.63 22.50 16 100 
JEPES Warfighting Pillar 7,812 158.45 43.00 24 250 
Physical Fitness Test Average 7,812 251.08 27.37 97 300 
Physical Fitness Test Average Scaled 7,812 53.12 27.94 0 100 
Combat Fitness Test Average 7,812 268.11 28.95 70 300 
Combat Fitness Test Average Scaled 7,812 48.39 28.50 0 100 
JEPES Physical Toughness Pillar 7,812 126.89 54.86 0 250 
AFQT Score (as proxy) 7,812 59.76 17.62 21 99 
JEPES Mental Agility Pillar 7,812 149.39 44.05 53 248 
Proficiency Marks Average (as proxy) 7,812 44.88 0.94 41 49 
Conduct Marks Average (as proxy) 7,812 44.86 0.99 39 49 
JEPES Command Input Pillar 7,812 224.37 4.63 203 245 
Metric 3 Score 7,812 659.09 86.71 379 949 
Metric 3 Tier I Cutoff 7,812 773.75 0.00 774 774 
Metric 3 Tier II Cutoff 7,812 681.25 0.00 681 681 
HQR3 7,812 0.40 0.49 0 1 
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The enlistee and recruiter are considered HQ if they exceed the 60th percentile, or 
Tier II, for their score. Tier I is the 90th percentile. Equation 5 depicts the quality 
relationship between Marine recruiter and enlistee according to Metric 3: 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻3 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸3𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ≥  𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸3𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃60  (5) 
where HQE3 or HQR3 equal 1 if the Metric3Score is above the 60th percentile for their 
group and 0 otherwise. 
d. Metric 4: Reenlistment Standards Tiered Evaluation System 
The fourth metric uses the reenlistment standards tiered evaluation system to define 
quality. When Marines near the end of their enlistments, they must compete for “boat 
spaces” or compete to reenlist. The Marine Corps end-strength limits and own grade 
shaping mean the majority of Marines will leave service after their first enlistment. In order 
to rank the Marines by quality, the Marine Corps uses a tiered evaluation system for 
reenlistments. Crider (2015) describes and evaluates this system and the effectiveness for 
long-term retention. Four quality tiers describe each Marine’s quality and are based on an 
individual’s percentile in the population: Tier 1 are considered “eminently qualified” and 
comprise the 91st to 100th percentile; Tier 2 are considered “highly competitive” and 
comprise the next 30% (61st–90th percentile); Tier 3 are considered “competitive” and make 
up the next 50% (11th–60th percentile) and the remainder fall into Tier 4, the “below 
average” rank. Commanders recommend or do not recommend Marines for reenlistment 
and they consider their quality as described by the tiers in making this decision. The tier 
level itself does not determine whether an individual receives reenlistment, however. 
The components within the tiered system consist of the physical fitness test, combat 
fitness test, proficiency and conduct marks, rifle score, MCMAP belt attained, and whether 
an individual was meritoriously promoted. Individuals are normally promoted on the 1st of 
the month and meritorious promotion dates of rank occur on the 2nd of the month 
(Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2006). Crider found that the existing tiered 
evaluation system is a good predictor of promotion speed, career longevity, and FITREP 
averages since any increases in tier level resulted in more favorable outcomes. Although 
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promotion speed, career longevity, and FITREP averages are not necessarily standard 
measures of HQ, Crider uses them as his metric for HQ. The reenlistment standards tier 
evaluation system provides the basis for the fourth metric. 
For Metric 4, I use these the reenlistment tier evaluation score to determine whether 
the recruiter and enlistee are HQ. The Metric 4 score is depicted in Equation 6. 
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸4𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 +
 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 + (𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ∗ 100)  (6) 
The scores for the enlistee and recruiter’s average proficiency and conduct marks 
are multiplied by 100. The MCMAP rank is based on a 100-point scale similar to Metric 3 
and the variable for Meritorious Promotion is binary and either 1 if promoted on the 2nd of 
the month to either E4 or E5 or 0 otherwise. The sum of the scores is the Metric4Score. 
The individual components of the score and tier cutoffs for Tier I and Tier II are listed in 
Table 13.  
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Table 13. Metric 4 Components and Tiers 
            
Enlistee  
   N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Proficiency Marks Average Scaled 219,535 432.17 15.29 20 500 
Conduct Marks Average Scaled 219,535 430.90 16.80 40 500 
Physical Fitness Test Average 219,535 242.05 35.47 23 300 
Combat Fitness Test Average 219,535 271.54 25.39 37 300 
Rifle (Table I & II) Score Average 219,535 303.07 19.45 83 346 
MCMAP Belt Score Scaled 219,535 12.87 10.37 0 95 
Meritorious Promotion (to E4 or E5) 219,535 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Metric 4 Tier I Cutoff 219,535 1794.00 0.00 1794 1794 
Metric 4 Tier II Cutoff 219,535 1720.00 0.00 1720 1720 
Metric 4 Score 219,535 1697.99 87.59 893 2052 
HQE4 219,535 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Recruiter  
   N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Proficiency Marks Average Scaled 7,852 448.86 9.40 410 490 
Conduct Marks Average Scaled 7,852 448.66 9.91 390 490 
Physical Fitness Test Average 7,852 251.01 27.42 97 300 
Combat Fitness Test Average 7,852 268.13 28.95 70 300 
Rifle (Table I & II) Score Average 7,852 307.85 16.79 144 348 
MCMAP Belt Score Scaled 7,852 25.56 16.38 5 95 
Meritorious Promotion (to E4 or E5) 7,852 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Metric 4 Tier I Cutoff 7,852 1881.00 0.00 1881 1881 
Metric 4 Tier II Cutoff 7,852 1779.00 0.00 1779 1779 
Metric 4 Score 7,852 1768.72 78.07 1442 2047 




The enlistee and recruiter are considered HQ if they exceed the 60th percentile, or 
Tier II, for their score. Tier I is the 90th percentile. Equation 7 depicts the quality 
relationship between Marine recruiter and enlistee according to Metric 4. 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻4 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸4𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ≥  𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸4𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃60  (7) 
where HQE4 or HQR4 equals 1 if the Metric4Score is above the 60th percentile for their 
group and 0 otherwise. 
e. Metric 5: Promotion Speed to E5 and FITREPs 
This research will also incorporate other more obvious measures of quality 
including promotion speed to E5 for enlistees and fitness reports (FITREPs) for recruiters. 
Individuals who promote faster are identified and selected by the Marine Corps as HQ—
this is self-evident. Although existing literature does examine promotion speed and 
whether an individual promotes more slowly or more quickly than their peers, existing 
research evaluates the promotion relative to the entire peer group in the service as opposed 
to within the MOS. The Marine Corps promotes enlisted personnel within MOS and, as a 
result, promotion speed within MOS will provide a better gauge of quality. 
For the enlistee Metric 5 (HQE5), HQE5 is determined using the promotion speed 
within MOS. Specifically, the enlistee is HQ if they promoted within the first 25% of their 
peer group within their MOS as depicted in Equation 8. I only included the MOS if there 
were more than 20 individuals who promoted to E5 within the MOS to ensure a large 
enough sample. Additionally, I used the MOS at the individual’s promotion date to Sgt and 
not necessarily their initial PMOS.  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸5 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸5 ≤  𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸5(𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦𝐸𝐸5𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆)𝑃𝑃25  (8) 
where HQE5 equal 1 if the enlistee monthstoE5 is less than the 25th percentile and 0 
otherwise. Table 14 depicts the components and 25th percentile based upon the E5 MOS. 
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Table 14. Enlistee Metric 5 Components 
  N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Months to E5 Promotion 53,083 46.28 8.69 0.00 107.50 
By MOS, 25th Percentile Cutoff for 
Months to E5 Promotion 53,083 41.59 4.00 33.00 56.80 
HQE5 264,681 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
 
Additionally, performance evaluations within FITREPs will also provide a measure 
of quality. As described in the MCO P1610.7F Performance Evaluation System 
(Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2010, p. 4), the “fitness report provides the 
primary means for evaluating a Marine’s performance to support the Commandant’s efforts 
to select the best qualified personnel for promotion.” The senior Marine (“reporting 
senior,”) evaluates the subordinate Marine (Marine reported on, or MRO) against other 
subordinate Marines who the reporting senior observed. The relative value (RV), based on 
a range from 80 to 100 with 90 as the mean, is further broken down into the top third, 
middle third, and bottom third. The RV is calculated at report processing and then 
recalculated as a cumulative RV whenever the reporting senior writes another FITREP. As 
a result, the Marine can either stay near their existing ranking, move up, or move down 
depending on the future reports.  
For the recruiter Metric 5 (HQR5), HQR5 is determined by whether or not the 
recruiter’s average cumulative relative value is greater than 93.3 (within the top third of 
their cumulative peer group average) as depicted in Equation 9. The avgRelValue is 
calculated by taking the average of all of the recruiter’s cumulative relative values for their 
FITREPs.  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅5 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 > 93.3  (9) 
where HQR5 equal 1 if the recruiter’s AvgRelativeValue is greater than 93.3 and 0 
otherwise. The components for HQR5 are depicted in Table 15. 
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Table 15. Recruiter Metric 5 Components 
            
   N   Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
FITREP Average  
Cumulative Relative Value 10,119 90.84 3.31 80 100 
HQR5 10,119 0.24 0.43 0 1 
4. Issues and Remedies 
While merging the data, I encountered various issues either due to data that was 
missing or incorrectly coded. The follow describes my attempts to remedy the issues I 
encountered.  
a. Enlistment and Ship Dates 
Various dates were missing entries and some of the data sources used separate 
names to describe the same event. For example, the TFDW data that provided the Armed 
Forces Original Entry Date (OED) and Armed Forces Active-Duty Base Date (AFADBD) 
were not listed for many of the enlistees and recruiters. I found the MCRISS data more 
complete with these dates and so used the date of enlistment as the OED and the ship date 
as the AFADB or Pay Entry Base Date (PEBD). Additionally, a small number of enlistees 
and recruiters had multiple enlistments dates and I used the most recent enlistment date 
and ship date. 
b. Physical Fitness Test and Combat Fitness Test 
Because both the PFT and CFT will be included in the metrics, I needed to calculate 
a single PFT and CFT score to use for each enlistee and recruiter. Using longitudinal PFT 
and CFT scores, I calculated the average PFT and CFT score for each individual over their 
service. Although many of the metrics I will describe use a single score (typically the most 
recent score), using an average provides a better guage of an individual’s sustained physical 
performance over their career. 
c. Proficiency and Conduct Marks 
Marines in grades E1 to E4 receive proficiency and conduct marks semi-annually. 
These marks are recorded as average in grade, average in enlistment, and average in 
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service. Some of the data was missing for Marines, so those Marines did not receive scores 
for the metrics that required them.  
d. Rifle Score 
Some of the rifle scores for the enlistees and recruiters were not numeric since the 
score was recorded as a three-digit alphanumeric score with either E for expert, S for 
sharpshooter, or M for marksman in front of the two-digit score. I dropped these 
alphanumeric observations. Additionally, Metric 2 required the Table 1 score only though 
the rifle score is normally composed of the sum of Table I (250 point maximum) and Table 
II (100 point maximum) for a combined 350 point maximum. Metric 3 required the 
combined rifle score. If an individual only had a combined Table I and II score, then they 
were omitted from Metric 2.  
e. Recruiter FITREPs 
In order to cutoff the FITREPs for when the recruiter attended the BRC, I use the 
billet MOS (BMOS) 8411 to determine the FITREP they received when they first attend 
BRC. I then filtered and dropped all the FITREPs succeeding the BRC FITREP. To 
calculate the average cumulative value, I first removed FITREPs that were written by RS 
who were not active-duty Marine Corps officers. I removed these additional reports to 
ensure that the standards would be uniform across the recruiters since, in my opinion, 
Marine Corps officers will evaluate more uniformly than other service or civilian raters. I 
also removed reports if they were end of service, active reserve component, or reserve 
training. Because FITREPs may be subjective in nature, I filtered the results to only include 
Marines with three or more observed FITREPs. Finally, only reports that were observed 
were included. 
f. Children (dependents at contract) 
Although the MCRISS data details whether an individual has dependents at 
contract, it does not describe whether they are children or a spouse. In order to determine 
whether they have children, I assume that a dependent of one with a status of married means 
the spouse is the dependent and a dependent of two or more with a marital status of married 
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means the individual has children. I also assume that individuals with at least one 
dependent and a marital status of single or divorced means that they have children. 
g. Promotion to E5 
An easy means to calculate promotion speed would be to use all Marines without 
accounting for specific MOS. However, this method is rudimentary and does not account 
for differences in promotion speed by MOS. Certain MOS promote extremely slow while 
other low-density MOS may promote more quickly.  So, instead, I calculated the first 25% 
to promote within their MOS. I used the MOS at each enlistee’s date of rank to E5 and 
calculated their months to E5 based on their ship date. Since some of the MOS listed have 
low density or may be erroneous entries, I exclude any MOS with fewer than 20 individuals 
who promoted to E5. Also, given that many Marines will not promote to E5 within their 
first enlistment, the quantity of HQE5 is significantly smaller than the other metrics.  
5. Summary Statistics 
a. Enlistees 
The 264,381 enlistees were recruited from across the United States as depicted in 
Figure 7 with the most enlistees coming from California, Texas, Florida, and New York. The 
summary statistics for these enlistees are depicted in Table 16. The majority of enlistees are 
male with only 10% female. The majority are also under the age of 19 at enlistment with just 
23% older than 19. Only 2% are married and just 6% have attended at least one semester of 
college. The Southeast economic region represents the largest percentage of enlistees with 
26% followed by the Far West with 17%. Combat service support MOS are the highest 
density at 41% with combat arms representing 30% of enlistees. For waivers at enlistment, 





Figure 7. Geographic Representation of Enlistees by State Home of Record 
(48 Contiguous States) 
 
 
This figure depicts the enlistees from 2011 to 2019 and their respective state home of record. The percentages 
depicted are determined by the total enlistees from this period and the proportion for each state. The colors 
provide a visual representation of the same information. The percentage of enlistees from Alaska and Hawaii 
are 0.3% and 0.4% respectively. 
Table 16. Enlistee Summary Statistics 
   Obs.  Percent 
Demographics 
Female 25,439 10% 
Male 239,242 90% 
Asian 7,656 3% 
Black 28,659 11% 
Hispanic 56,695 21% 
White 223,112 84% 
Age 19 or Younger at Accession 204,467 77% 
Age Over 19 at Accession 60,214 23% 
Single at Accession 260,112 98% 
Married at Accession 4,070 2% 
Divorced, Separated, Widowed at Accession 480 0% 
Children at Accession 3,341 1% 
Education: Attended College (at least one semester) 15,795 6% 
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Table 16 cont’d. Enlistee Summary Statistics 
   Obs.  Percent 
Physical Characteristics 
BMI Category Obese 5,071 2% 
BMI Category Overweight 90,817 34% 
BMI Category Normal 163,667 62% 
BMI Category Underweight 5,120 2% 
Exceeded Retention Weight Standards at Accession 40,379 15% 
BCP Assignment During Enlistment 10,838 4% 
Home of Record 
Economic Region New England 10,585 4% 
Economic Region Mideast 34,108 13% 
Economic Region Great Lakes 39,986 15% 
Economic Region Plains 17,864 7% 
Economic Region Southeast 68,410 26% 
Economic Region Southwest 34,860 13% 
Economic Region Rocky Mountain 9,944 4% 
Economic Region Far West 45,278 17% 
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 
Combat Service Support MOS 109,621 41% 
Other MOS 26,534 10% 
Combat MOS 80,447 30% 
Aviation MOS 47,496 18% 
Waivers Required at Accession 
Waiver at Accession for Age 95 0% 
Waiver at Accession for Citizenship 1 0% 
Waiver at Accession for Dependents 3,421 1% 
Waiver at Accession for Drugs, Alcohol Abuse 77,916 29% 
Waiver at Accession for Legal 21,510 8% 
Waiver at Accession for Physical or Medical (height, weight, 
BUMED) 34,556 13% 
Waiver at Accession for Mental Health 12 0% 
Waiver at Accession for Education Level 6 0% 
Waiver at Accession for Prior Military Service 515 0% 
Waiver at Accession for Unique (e.g., tattoo) 30,587 12% 
Total Observations 264,681   
The table provides summary statistics for the recruiters. Of note, some of the data was missing such 
as the accession characteristics for height, weight, and state home of record and MOS. Race and 
ethnicity are separate categories. Not included are the “declined to respond” and other smaller 
categories or both race and ethnicity. Percentages were rounded to the nearest whole percentage. 
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b. Recruiters 
The 12,125 recruiters were recruited from across the United States as depicted in 
Figure 8 with the most recruiters coming from California, Texas, Florida, and New York. 
The summary statistics for the recruiters are depicted in Table 17. The majority of recruiters 
are male but with only 5% female compared with the 10% female enlistees. The majority 
are also under the age of 27 when assigned to recruting duty with just 40% older than 27. 
Much different from the enlistees, the majority of the recruiters are married with just 15% 
single. Exactly the same as enlistees, only 6% have attended at least one semester of 
college. The Southeast economic region also represents the largest percentage of enlistees 
with 28% followed by the Far West with 17%. As with the enlistees, combat service 
support MOS are the highest density at 42% with only 20% of combat arms MOS 
represented. Just as with the enlistees, 29% of recruiters required a waiver for drugs or 
alcohol abuse at accession. 
Figure 8. Geographic Representation of Recruiters by State Home of Record 
(48 Contiguous States) 
 
This figure depicts the recruiters paired with enlistees that enlisted from 2011 to 2019 and the recruiter’s 
respective state home of record. The percentages depicted are determined by the total enlistees from this 
period and the proportion for each state. The colors provide a visual representation of the same information. 
The percentage of recruiters from Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico are 0.2%, 0.6%, and 0.5% respectively. 
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Table 17. Recruiter Summary Statistics 
      
   Obs. Percent 
Demographics 
Female 592 5% 
Male 11,532 95% 
Asian 304 3% 
Black 1,573 13% 
Hispanic 2,267 19% 
White 7,164 59% 
Older than 27 at Assignment to BRC 4,848 40% 
27 or Younger at Assignment to BRC 7,276 60% 
Single at Assignment to BRC 1,842 15% 
Married at Assignment to BRC 9,385 77% 
Divorced at Assignment to BRC 887 7% 
Children at Assignment to BRC 6,167 51% 
Education: Attended College (at least one semester) 711 6% 
Physical Characteristics 
BMI Category Obese at Accession 468 4% 
BMI Category Overweight at Accession 3,155 26% 
BMI Category Normal at Accession 7,925 65% 
BMI Category Underweight at Accession 378 3% 
Exceeded Retention Weight Standards at Accession 1,584 13% 
Assigned to BCP During Service 223 2% 
Home of Record 
Economic Region New England 377 3% 
Economic Region Mideast 1,551 13% 
Economic Region Great Lakes 1,720 14% 
Economic Region Plains 688 6% 
Economic Region Southeast 3,349 28% 
Economic Region Southwest 1,811 15% 
Economic Region Rocky Mountain 403 3% 
Economic Region Far West 2,026 17% 
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 
Combat Service Support MOS 5,033 42% 
Other MOS 927 8% 
Combat Arms MOS 2,423 20% 




Table 17 cont’d. Recruiter Summary Statistics 
   Obs. Percent 
Waivers Required at Accession 
Waiver at Accession for Citizenship 3 0% 
Waiver at Accession for Dependents 587 5% 
Waiver at Accession for Drugs, Alcohol Abuse 3,552 29% 
Waiver at Accession for Legal 1,441 12% 
Waiver at Accession for Physical or Medical (height, weight, 
BUMED) 1,050 9% 
Waiver at Accession for Mental Health 4 0% 
Waiver at Accession for Education Level 10 0% 
Waiver at Accession for Prior Military Service 78 1% 
Waiver at Accession for Unique (e.g., tattoo) 1,342 11% 
Total Observations 12,125   
The table provides summary statistics for the enlistees. Of note, some of the data was missing such as the 
accession characteristics for height, weight, and state home of record and MOS. Race and ethnicity are 
separate categories. Not included are the “declined to respond” and other smaller categories or both race 
and ethnicity. Percentages were rounded to the nearest whole percentage. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. A Conceptual Model 
Prior to presenting my final model, I specify a conceptual model with the HQ 
enlistee metric as the dependent variable and HQ recruiter metric as the explanatory 
variable. The HQ enlistee and HQ recruiter are determined using five metrics discussed in 
Part B of this chapter. In the simplest form, Equation 10 describes this relationship. 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 +  𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅   (10) 
where HQE is either 1 for HQ or 0 otherwise for enlistee for recruiter-enlistee pair i, HQR 
is either 1 for HQ or 0 otherwise for the recruiter. This conceptual model likely involves 
significant bias because it does not consider that metric quality varies over time and also 
does not consider differences in market conditions. For market conditions, it is possible 
that HQ recruiters are more likely to be assigned to markets with higher propensity to enlist 
among HQ candidates. Because they have a more “desirable” recruiting market, they will 
more likely contract higher quality enlistees and this may be unrelated to their quality as a 
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recruiter. I attempt to correct for both of these potential omitted variables bias in the 
following two sections. 
2. Including Year Fixed Effects (Enlistee Ship Year) 
The recruiter and enlistee quality varies by time and metric. Because recruiter data 
is more limited earlier on and the recruiters with missing data do not receive scores for the 
metrics, the number of HQ recruiters is lower for the earlier years. As a result, there are 
fewer recruiter-enlistee pairs within the models and, as a result, fewer HQ enlistees. 
Towards the end of the time period, junior Marines will be at a disadvantage since they 
will have lower proficiency and conduct marks following their initial training and will not 
have received the higher marks typically received at their final duty station. Therefore, 
because Metrics 2–4 are composed of proficiency and conduct marks, fewer enlistees will 
be determined as HQ in these later years due to their lower average scores. Also, the HQE5 
metric is limited for the later years since policy required 24 months of service prior to 
promotion to E5 and Marines with less than 24 months of service will not have had the 
opportunity to promote to E5. Figure 9 depicts the HQ enlistees by metric for their ship 
year. Figure 10 depicts the HQ recruiters by metric and the year they started recruiting 
duty. For simplicity, the data within the figure excludes recruiters that started recruiting 
duty prior to 2009. 
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In order to remove the bias caused by the variation over time for the different HQ 
metrics, I use year fixed effects based on the ship date of the enlistee. By including these 
fixed effects and holding constant the year that the enlistee shipped to recruit training, I 
attempt to remove the variation between years and evaluate the variation within each 
calendar year (2011–2019). 
3. Including Recruiting Substation Fixed Effects 
Recruiting markets vary by RSS and these differences can bias the estimates. 
Common elements that vary between RSSs correspond to propensity to enlist, availability 
within the market, and market quality. Propensity to enlist may be affected by a multitude 
of factors such as: size of the veteran population, general attitudes toward the military, 
general political affiliation, proximity to a military installation, previous recruiter 
misconduct within the RSS or local area, current recruiter influence within the high 
schools, the presence of Junior Reserve Officer Training Cadre (JROTC) programs at the 
schools, and marijuana legalization since some applicants may be unwilling to discontinue 
their use. Availability of the market or applicants is also affected by many factors such as: 
the proximity of applicants in a rural vs. urban area; size of the RSS thereby determining 
the mission; geographic location; age of the population whether younger or older; the local 
unemployment rate; gender ratios since more males typically enlist than females; the 
military and civilian wage rate; and competition from other services recruiters. Market 
quality varies by RSS due to median income, education attainment, college enrollment, 
crime rates that affect eligibility, drug use and convictions that affect eligibility, and 
general aptitude as measured by the AFQT (whether predominantly Alphas or Bravos). 
Figure 11 depicts a conceptual diagram of the HQ recruiter effect on the HQ enlistee. The 
market conditions affect the quality of the enlistee.  
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Figure 11. Conceptual Diagram of the Effect of Market Conditions on 
Enlistee Quality 
 
In order to remove the bias caused by the variation between recruiting markets at 
the RSS level, I include RSS fixed effects based on the RSS that the enlistee contracted 
with the recruiter. By including these fixed effects and holding constant the RSS that the 
enlistee was recruited from, I am attempting to remove the variation between recruiting 
markets such as propensity to enlist, availability of applicants, and average quality of 
candidates and instead only analyze the variation within each specific RSS. 
4. The Final Model 
For the final model, I attempt to remove the bias caused by differences in years that 
the individuals shipped to recruit training and due to differences in recruiting markets. I 
include year fixed effects (based on the calendar year the enlistee shipped) and RSS fixed 
effects to hold constant the market conditions. Equation 11 depicts the final model.  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅,𝑌𝑌,𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 +  𝜇𝜇𝑌𝑌 + 𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅,𝑌𝑌,𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (11) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑌𝑌 are calendar year fixed effects based on the year the enlistee from recruiter-
enlistee pair i shipped to recruit training and 𝜇𝜇𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 are RSS fixed effects based on the 
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recruiter-enlistee pair i RSS. It is important to note that on average, Marine recruiters’ 
contract approximately 12 enlistees each year. Given that this final model includes year 
fixed effects, the model will be measuring the effect of HQ recruiters on HQ enlistees 
within specific accession years and within a specific RSS. This means that the model will 
have less statistical power because it is only considering variation within each RSS. As a 
result, the coefficient estimates will be less-precisely estimated. Still, this is likely the most 
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V. RESULTS 
This chapter provides the results from the LPM final model for enlistee and recruiter 
Metrics 1–5 for a total of 25 regressions. Recruiter metrics are labeled HQR1-5 for Metrics 
1–5 and enlistee metrics are labeled HQE1-5 for Metrics 1–5. I close this chapter with an 
alternative theory for why the estimated effect of HQ recruiter is positive on HQ enlistee and 
then provide supporting evidence that is consistent with my interpretation of the results. 
A. OVERALL RESULTS 
With the defined HQ standards for 264,681 enlistees from 2011 to 2019 and 12,125 
recruiters, I evaluate the 264,681 recruiter-enlistee pairs. I control for the recruiting 
substation to attempt to remove bias due to differences in market conditions, and I control 
for calendar year that the enlistee shipped to recruit training to attempt to remove additional 
bias from the estimates due to differences between calendar years. The estimated effects of 
HQR1-5 on HQE1-5 for the LPM are depicted in Table 18.  
Table 18. OLS LPM Final Model Estimated Effects between HQ Recruiter 
Metrics 1–5 and HQ Enlistee Metrics 1–5 
 
The models include recruiting station fixed effects to hold constant market conditions between 
RSSs and year fixed effects to hold constant the years the enlistees ship to recruit training. The 
results depict a total of 25 regressions using OLS LPMs with the metrics HQE1-5 as the dependent 
variables and metric HQR1-5 as the explanatory variables. The symbols “***” indicate significance 
at the 99% level of confidence, “**” at the 95% level of confidence, and “*” at the 90% level of 
confidence. The color green indicates a positive estimated effect for the coefficient estimates. 
HQE1 HQE2 HQE3 HQE4 HQE5
0.010    0.002     0.004     0.000     0.001     
*** **
0.003    0.004     0.004     0.003     0.000     
*
0.007    0.004     0.002     0.003     0.002     
*** *
0.004    0.004     0.002     0.004     0.001     
* *
0.005    0.005     0.005     0.004     0.003     







The results depict the estimated effects of the HQ recruiter metrics on the HQ 
enlistee metrics:  
• Metric HQR1 HQ recruiters contract more HQ enlistees across all metrics 
and at statistically significant rates for metrics HQE1,3. 
• Metric HQR2 HQ recruiters contract more HQ enlistees across all metrics 
and at statistically significant rates for metric HQE3.  
• Metric HQR3 HQ recruiters contract more HQ enlistees across all metrics 
and at statistically significant rates for metrics HQE1,2.  
• Metric HQR4 HQ recruiters contract more HQ enlistees across all metrics 
and at statistically significant rates for metrics HQE2,4.  
• Metric HQR5 HQ recruiters contract more HQ enlistees across all metrics 
and at statistically significant rates for metrics HQE1-3,5. 
These results are simply interpreted. For example, in the upper left box with HQE1 
and HQR1 for the OLS LPM: On average, when removing variations due to market 
conditions between RSSs and across accession years, the estimated effect of a HQR1 metric 
recruiter on a HQE1 metric enlistee is 1.0 percentage point at the significance level of .01. 
For example, this means that an increase in the number of recruiters who are high school 
graduates with an AFQT greater than 50 (an Alpha) by 15 percentage points would 
correspondingly increase the number of enlistee Alphas by 15 percentage points (due to 
the coefficient estimate of 0.01). If 60% of enlistees were alphas, the increase in HQ 
recruiters would lead to Alphas comprising 75% of enlistees based on these estimates.  
B. DETAILED RESULTS 
Table 19 provides the detailed coefficient estimates, standard errors, t statistics, P-
values, and number of observations for the OLS LPM regressions. HQE1-5, as the 
dependent variables, are depicted vertically and HQR1-5, as the key X variables, are 
depicted horizontally. The final model attempts to remove potential biases caused by 
variations between recruiting markets and variations between accession years. The 
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constants and estimated effects for these fixed effects are omitted from the table results. 
Standard errors are robust.  
Table 19. Detailed Results for the Final Model OLS LPM Regressions 
                      





β1        0.010           0.002           0.004           0.000           0.001  
 Std. Err.        0.002           0.002           0.002           0.002           0.001  
t        5.320           1.081           1.991           0.061           1.223  
P-value        0.000           0.280           0.047           0.952           0.221  
Obs.    260,556      236,564      216,824      216,824      260,583 





β1        0.003           0.004           0.004           0.003           0.000  
 Std. Err.        0.002           0.003           0.003           0.003           0.001  
t        1.180           1.507           1.722           1.306           0.433  
P-value        0.238           0.132           0.085           0.192           0.665  
Obs.    183,976      163,998      160,971      160,971      183,994 





β1        0.007           0.004           0.002           0.003           0.002  
 Std. Err.        0.002           0.003           0.003           0.003           0.001  
t        3.040           1.769           0.693           1.186           1.587  
P-value        0.002           0.077           0.489           0.235           0.113  
Obs.    180,949      161,154      158,330      158,330      180,967  





β1        0.004           0.004           0.002           0.004           0.001  
 Std. Err.        0.002           0.003           0.003           0.003           0.001  
t        1.564           1.718           0.978           1.774           0.764  
P-value        0.118           0.086           0.328           0.076           0.445  
Obs.    181,687      161,840      158,964      158,964      181,705 





β1        0.005           0.005           0.005           0.004           0.003  
 Std. Err.        0.002           0.003           0.003           0.003           0.001  
t        2.312           1.998           1.922           1.428           3.057  
P-value        0.021           0.046           0.055           0.153           0.002  
Obs.    217,382      196,898      181,337      181,337      217,400  
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C. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY 
Although the findings describe a relationship that suggests a positive effect of HQ 
recruiters on HQ enlistees (determined HQ by the metrics), one could argue that the HQ 
recruiters may be more selective and therefore may recruit fewer enlistees than the lower-
quality recruiters. To examine this theory, I analyze recruiter-enlistee pairs for enlistees 
that shipped to recruit training during 2015 and recruiters that attended the BRC after 2013. 
If recruiters attended earlier, they may not be on recruiting duty for all of 2015 and the 
number of contracts for that year would most likely be lower. In order to determine whether 
the recruiters in that year were more selective, I count the number of enlistees that they 
contracted and include this as the key X variable. I include the HQ enlistee metrics as the 
dependent variable. The results are depicted in Table 20 for models HQE1-5 with the 
constants omitted. Each of the models include an enlistment metric as the dependent 
variable and the number of contracts by their respective recruiter within that year as the 
key X variable. Based on these estimates, the number of contracts the recruiter made has 
no statistical significance on any of the metrics except HQE1. However, the results show 
that each additional contract within this time period increased the likelihood of contracting 
a HQ enlistee and this result provides cautious optimism. seemingly the recruiters are not 
lowering their contract numbers in order to be more selective. 
Table 20. Robustness Check for Recruiter Selection of HQ Enlistees 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  HQE1 HQE2 HQE3 HQE4 HQE5 
Number of Contracts (2015) 
0.00292*** 0.00161 -0.000377 0.00131 -0.000328 
(3.5) (1.67) (-0.39) (-1.36) (-0.60) 
N 11264 10581 10555 10555 11266 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Within this chapter, I discuss how the five metrics for both enlistees and recruiters 
correlate and their useability for determining HQ. Next, I discuss how the Marine Corps 
should utilize and implement these metrics when identifying Marines for assignment to the 
BRC. I provide my recommendations and then conclude with additional topics for further 
research. 
Before I estimate the effect of HQ recruiters on HQ enlistees, I define quality using 
existing standards. These five metrics allow me to determine HQ recruiters and enlistees. 
Defining something as abstract as HQ is no easy feat. I use pre-existing standards to build 
metrics to determine quality in an ad-hoc manner. As I show above, there are multiple 
metrics employed by the Marine Corps, but not all of these metrics are equally useful.  
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR A HIGH-QUALITY DETERMINATION 
As a means of defining HQ for recruiters, Metric 1 and 5 are less useful than Metrics 
2–4. Although the majority of existing research focuses on the AFQT as a measure of the 
enlistee’s quality, using metric HQR1 to determine HQ recruiters is not useful. First, with 
66% of the recruiter population categorized as HQE1, the metric limits the researcher’s 
ability to differentiate HQ from the average. With only 44% remaining, average and low-
quality take on a similar meaning. Second, given the low correlation between the HQR1 
metric and the other HQR2-4 metrics (0.10, 0.27, 0.07, and 0.06 respectively), these metrics 
are not identifying the same individuals as HQ. If the Marine Corps used Metric 2 and now 
Metric 3 to determine who to promote and Metric 4 to determine who to retain, Metric 1’s 
value is less obvious—ostensibly the recruiter’s AFQT score may be less important. 
Because of the low correlation, the Marine Corps may seek to focus less discriminately on 
individuals that have a high school diploma and an AFQT higher than 50 (Alphas). 
Consequently, Metric 1 is less useful for defining quality for the potential Marine recruiter. 
The HQR5 metric is also less useful for determining HQ. First, because Marines do 
not receive FITREPs until the rank of sergeant and this metric only included those with 
three or more observed FITREPs, only 10,119 of the 12,125 recruiters were included in the 
78 
metric which creates bias towards more senior Marines. Also, excluding those recruiters 
that do not have a score prevents the widespread implementation of this metric for the 
identification and assignment of all Marines, including junior sergeants, to recruiting. 
Second, although counterintuitive, consistently scoring in the top third of one’s RS on their 
FITREPs is not highly correlated with the other HQ metrics (0.06, 0.26, 0.25, and 0.27 for 
Metrics 1–4 respectively). Because HQR5 cannot be widely implemented and does not 
correlate with the Marine Corps existing HQ standards for promotion and retention, this 
metric is also less useful.  
For enlistees, the HQE5 metric is also less useful for determining HQ. With only 
13,494 enlistees qualifying as HQ according to this metric, this small group is only five 
percent of the enlistees. Although many Marines may promote to E5 prior to the end of 
their first enlistment, recent policy changes requiring Marines to possess 48 months of 
service prior to promotion to E5 will prevent any Marines with a four-year contract from 
promoting to E5 within their first enlistment. Because many HQ Marines will not reenlist 
and will never exceed 48 months of service, these individuals would be excluded with a 
metric that focuses on promotion to E5. For determination of HQ enlistees in their first 
enlistment, promotion speed to E5 is therefore less useful for defining quality. 
The recruiter Metrics 2–4 are more useful than Metrics 1 and 5 for determining 
quality. First, each of these metrics is highly correlated. For example, the HQE2 metric 
correlation is 0.56 and 0.64 for metrics HQE3 and HQE4 respectively and the HQE3 
metric’s correlation with metric HQE4 is 0.60. These metrics are measuring shared 
characteristics that the Marine Corps has determined important and, because they overlap, 
they collectively represent the best approach to determining which Marines to assign to 
recruiting duty. Second, each of these metrics is positively correlated with the quality of 
the enlistees they recruit—regardless of the HQ enlistee metric. Third, the inputs for these 
metrics are available early during a Marine’s enlistment. There is no waiting period prior 
to implementing these metrics as Marines semi-annually complete PFTs, CFTs, receive 
command marks (formerly proficiency and conduct marks but now the JEPES command 
input), and complete MCMAP training. Finally, the Marine Corps already uses these 
metrics to evaluate who to promote and retain.  
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In my opinion, Metric 2 is the most useful metric for determining HQ. First, the 
correlation between Metric 2 and Metric 4 is 0.64 for the enlistees and 0.73 for the 
recruiters. These correlations are the highest between any of the metrics. Second, although 
Metric 2 is the legacy promotion composite score, the metric can be used to determine 
quality since all Marines that would be evaluated for recruiting currently have these scores. 
If using Metric 3, the JEPES is new and Marines will not have the actual scores for both 
the command input and mental agility pillars. Although I used proxies for these scores with 
the AFQT score for mental agility and a combination of the proficiency and conduct marks 
for the command input pillar, Metric 2 requires no assumptions and proxies. Third, Metric 
3 and Metric 4 include the MCMAP belt as a component though including this measure 
biases those with more time in service. A Marine with only two years in service will have 
had less opportunities to conduct MCMAP training and “belt up” than a Marine with six 
years of service. Furthermore, a Marine in a unit with a motivated MCMAP instructor will 
have more opportunity to advance in MCMAP than a Marine in a unit with no MCMAP 
instructor. As a result, including the MCMAP belt may provide an advantage to individuals 
based on their environment and to no fault of their own. Finally, because including the 
MCMAP belt creates bias with regard to length of service, when using Metrics 3 and 4, 
individuals should be evaluated for quality against their peer group. Moreover, Metric 2 is 
versatile and can be used to evaluate individuals against other peer groups since they will 
also have a PFT, a CFT, and proficiency and conduct marks. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSIGNMENT OF MARINES TO RECRUITING  
The Marine Corps should consider incorporating any of these metrics into the 
identification and selection of Marines for assignment to recruiting duty. However, based 
on the statistically significant results for metric HQR5, the Marine Corps should primarily 
consider incorporating FITREPs into the assignment process. As depicted in Figure 12, the 
estimates for the HQR5 metric are consistent across all enlistee metrics. Although the 
HQR1 metric has the highest estimated effect on the HQE1 metric, the HQR1 is not 
consistent across the other enlistee metrics and near zero for the HQE4 metric. 
Furthermore, the metric HQR5 outperforms 17 of the other 20 recruiter models within each 
enlistee metric. The HQR5 metric is depicted by the magenta bar.  
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Figure 12. Recruiter Metrics 1–5 Estimated Effects on Enlistee Metrics 1–5 
 
The graph depicts a total of 25 regression models for the estimated effects of the five-recruiter metrics on the 
five-enlistee metrics. “***” denotes significance at the 99% level of confidence, “**” denotes significance 
at the 95% level of confidence, and “*” denotes significance at the 90% level of confidence. All HQ recruiter 
metrics’ estimated effects are positive and grouped by the enlistee metric. 
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Instead of merely estimating the effect of a HQ recruiter on the HQ enlistee within 
a single metric, I estimate the effect of each of the HQ recruiter metrics on all of the enlistee 
metrics. This approach provides a stronger argument for using any of these metrics for the 
assignment of Marines to recruiting duty since each of these metrics has a positive 
estimated effect with many having statistically significant coefficient estimates.  
Although the HQR5 metric has limitations, MMEA-25 could utilize a combination 
of the HQR5 and HQR2 metrics. FITREPs were evaluated prior to recruiting duty, and as 
previously mentioned, they were filtered so only individuals with at least three FITREPs 
were included. This means that junior sergeants with few FITREPs or perhaps no observed 
FITREPs were not included. Because sergeants may only receive one FITREP each year, 
it is possible that many junior sergeants that are screened for recruiting duty will not have 
any observed FITREPs and even probable that the majority of sergeants will not have three 
observed FITREPs. To address this issue, MMEA-25 could incorporate the HQR2 metric 
for Marines that lack FITREPs and utilize the HQR5 metric for those with FITREPs.  
If MMEA-25 used metric HQR2 in addition to HQR5, they would in effect be 
capturing many of the same individuals from Metrics 3 and 4. Because Metrics 2–4 are 
highly correlated they are measuring shared characteristics that the Marine Corps has 
determined important: PFT, CFT, rifle score, MCMAP (Metrics 3 and 4), and command 
input. Also, as previously mentioned, given the limitations of the MCMAP belt as a 
measure of quality, using Metric 2 would ensure those HQ Marines with limited access to 
a MCMAP instructor would still be determined HQ. 
Alternatively, the Marine Corps could choose a metric based on a different goal 
such as increasing the average AFQT of the force. Consider the average AFQT is 61.7 with 
a standard deviation of 17.7 for enlistees within this research. Given that 27.7% of the 
Marines score below 50 on the ASVAB, the Marine Corps could attempt to increase the 
average AFQT for the force by sending more Marines to recruiting duty based on the HQR1 
metric. HQ recruiters based on the HQR1 metric had the highest estimated effects on HQ 
enlistees based on the HQE1 metric with a statistically significant estimated effect of .01. 
Unfortunately, if the Marine Corps implemented the metric HQR1, they would likely not 
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improve the quality across all enlistee metrics. For example, HQ recruiters based on metric 
HQR1 have a very low estimated effect on HQ enlistees based on metric HQE4.  
A more optimal solution would be to implement metric HQR5 to increase enlistee 
HQ for metric HQE1 since this would also have favorable impacts across all the other 
enlistee metrics. Using the metric HQR5 as an example, consider that 24% of the recruiters 
within this research were determined HQ by metric HQR5. By increasing the number of 
HQ recruiters by an estimated 10 percentage points to 34%, the estimated number of HQ 
enlistees by metric HQE1 would increase by an estimated 5 percentage points (given that 
the coefficient estimate is 0.005). Because 72% of enlistees were determined HQ based on 
metric HQE1, increasing the number of HQ recruiters would increase the HQ enlistees to 
an estimated 77%. This increase in the HQ recruiters comes at a cost, however. If the 
Marine Corps sends more HQ Marines to recruiting duty, other competing requirements 
such as the other SDAs discussed in Chapter II, Part B, Section 4 would receive lower 
quality Marines. Moreover, the operational forces would lose a higher quantity of their HQ 
Marines to the recruiting force. However, given the focus on improving the quality of the 
force at accession, these benefits may be worth the cost. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Commandant’s force design requires a modernization of the manpower model. 
The industrial model that relied on mass by calculating how many “x” recruiters are 
required to produce “y” enlistees is archaic and sacrificed quality for quantity. The Marine 
Corps must modernize the selection and assignment process for Marines to recruiting duty 
in order to improve the quality and overall lethality of the future force. The Marine Corps 
should consider prioritizing quality when determining which Marines to assign to 
recruiting duty. The results from this thesis show all of the recruiter metrics have a positive 
estimated effect and many of the metrics are statistically significant.  
Based on my interviews with individuals at MMEA-25, FITREPs (and therefore 
HQR5) are not currently utilized when determining assignment of individuals to recruiting 
duty. I recommend MMEA-25 includes FITREPs in this process. Without needing to comb 
through FITREPs, MMEA-25 personnel would simply need the individual Marine’s 
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average of their reporting senior’s cumulative relative value. I recommend MMRP 
provides this metric to MMEA-25 for the assignment process.  
When MMEA-25 initializes their search for Marines within WebMass to determine 
the highest quality individuals, they could implement Metric 5 for Marines with FITREPs 
and Metric 2 for Marines that do not have FITREPs. Then, they would assign those 
identified HQ individuals to recruiting duty. In a minimum of four years, for those Marines 
that lack FITREP data, I recommend MMEA-25 shift to Metric 3 for determining HQ 
Marines to assign to recruiting duty since the JEPES scores will be recorded and available. 
By sending more HQ Marines to recruiting duty, the service may increase the quality of 
the enlistees and thereby improve the quality of the warfighting organization. 
Finally, although not the aim of this research, the interviews I conducted as the 
background for the recruiter assignment process uncovered abnormally high attrition for 
Marines both pre-class and in-class at the BRC. Chapter II, Part B discusses this attrition 
in depth. Since 61% of the HSST Marines attrite either pre-class or in-class, the Marine 
Corps is expending enormous dollars and wasted effort in the assignment of these 
individuals that will not ultimately graduate the BRC. Compared with the 35% of the 
volunteers that attrite either pre-class or in-class, the process for the involuntary assignment 
and screening seems ineffective. Based on my interviews, I recommend the service focus 
on the screening checklist and command involvement during that process. 
D. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Throughout my research, I explored the recruiter assignment process and detailed 
how individuals either volunteer or receive involuntary assignment to the BRC and 
eventually receive assignment to a specific RSS. This topic was unexplored prior to this 
research. I then created and utilized five metrics for determining HQ based on existing 
DOD and Marine Corps standards. Using these metrics, I categorized recruiters and 
enlistees as HQ and estimated the effects of the HQ recruiters on HQ enlistees. Finally, I 
proposed recommendations for the Marine Corps writ large and for MMEA-25 to 
incorporate these metrics into their selection and assignment of Marines to recruiting duty. 
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Because my research covered significant ground, there are now more areas for 
further research. The researcher could explore low-quality relationships between the 
recruiter and enlistee. The researcher could also explore whether Marines that volunteer 
for recruiting duty differ in quality from those that are involuntarily assigned. Because I 
established metrics that can determine HQ, the researcher can now explore many additional 
fields that were previously unavailable. 
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